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Background: The largest outbreak of Ebola virus disease in history happened between 2014-
2016 in West Africa. In Sierra Leone, one of the three most affected countries, more than 
14,000 people got infected and almost 4,000 died. Risk communication and social 
mobilization efforts aimed to engage with the public and to educate people to prevent further 
transmission of the virus. Not much is known how being exposed to this type of information 
influenced people’s knowledge, behaviors and risk perception around Ebola. Misinformation 
in the Ebola outbreak was widespread, but effective methods to counter real-life infectious 
disease misinformation have not been studied in a low-income setting.  
Aims: To determine the role of risk communication in the Ebola outbreak in Sierra Leone 
and to test the effectiveness of methods to debunk misinformation about infectious diseases.  
Methods: Four nationwide cross-sectional surveys among the general population of Sierra 
Leone were carried out at different timepoints of the Ebola outbreak (August 2014, n=1,413; 
October 2014, n=2,087; December 2014, n=3,540; July 2015, n=3,564). The four surveys 
were pooled (n=10,604) and the associations between exposure to various information 
sources and Ebola-specific knowledge, misconceptions, protective behavior and risk behavior 
were assessed using multilevel modeling. The associations between exposure to information 
sources and the perceived susceptibility to Ebola (i.e. risk perception), as well as the 
associations between Ebola-specific knowledge, misconceptions, behaviors and risk 
perception were measured in the pooled sample of the first three surveys (n=7,039). 
Qualitative, semi-structured interviews were conducted with 13 Sierra Leonean journalists 
who reported during the outbreak. Using thematic analysis, their perceived roles were 
mapped. After the epidemic, a three-arm, prospective, randomized controlled trial (RCT) 
(n=736) was carried out among adults in Freetown who were in possession of a smartphone 
with WhatsApp, to test whether 4-episode audio drama interventions could reduce the belief 
in typhoid-related misinformation.  
Results: Exposure to information sources was associated with increased Ebola-specific 
knowledge and protective behavior, but also - to a smaller extent - with misconceptions and 
risk behavior. Exposure to new media (e.g. mobile phones, internet) and community sources 
(e.g. religious/traditional leaders) as well as having Ebola-specific knowledge and engaging 
in frequent hand washing, was associated with increased risk perception. Having Ebola-
specific misconceptions and avoiding burials on the other hand, was associated with lower 
risk perception (Adjusted Odds Ratio (AOR) 0.7, 95% Confidence Interval (CI) 0.6-0.8 and 
AOR 0.8, 95% CI 0.6-1.0, respectively). Sierra Leonean journalists adopted various roles 
over the course of the outbreak; from being skeptical about the existence of an outbreak, to 
being eye-witnesses themselves. Through training about the virus, they later turned into 
public mobilizers and instructors, stepping away from their journalistic independence. Results 
from the RCT showed that the audio drama interventions significantly reduced the belief in 
typhoid-related misinformation compared to the control group. In Intervention Group A (in 
which the audio dramas actively engaged with the misinformation) and in Intervention Group 
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B (where only the correct information was given), the belief that typhoid always co-occurs 
with malaria was significantly reduced (Intervention Group A: AOR 0.3, 95% CI 0.2-0.5, 
Intervention Group B: AOR 0.6, 95% CI 0.4-0.8). Actively engaging with the 
misinformation, instead of only focusing on the correct information, resulted in the largest 
reductions in belief in misinformation.  
Conclusions: The associations between information sources and knowledge, misconceptions 
and behaviors show the need to have clear, transparent and contextualized information 
available during the entire course of an epidemic. The mixed findings regarding risk 
perception and various protective behaviors likely point to the complex interplay between 
behavior and risk perception, whereby adopting a behavior has an effect on how the risk of 
disease is perceived. As trusted, community-based sources, local journalists can be vital 
partners in an outbreak response. Making use of trusted sources is also one of the elements 
that will likely increase the chances of successfully countering real-life misinformation. Other 
elements include ensuring that the corrective information is in line with worldviews and 
repeated exposure to the information. A strategy which actively engages with the 
misinformation is likely to be more successful in debunking than merely focusing on the 
correct information. Taken together, the studies show that risk communication and 
misinformation management should be key pillars in health emergency response and 




POPULAR SCIENCE SUMMARY 
Infectious disease outbreaks can be terrifying. When it happens, many questions inevitably 
pop up: how deadly is the disease, how does it transmit, how do I keep myself and my loved 
ones safe? During the Ebola outbreak that ravaged through West Africa between 2014-2016, 
the public similarly needed information about what was happening. Over the course of the 
epidemic, it became clear that just by adding more hospital beds, the outbreak would not get 
under control. People needed information and guidance on how to stay safe, and what to do in 
case someone got sick. Various risk communication and social mobilization interventions 
were set up during the outbreak and collaborations with local media outlets were created. 
Studies in this thesis show that people who were exposed to information sources such as 
religious/traditional leaders or the internet, were more likely to have knowledge about Ebola, 
to engage in protective behaviors and to have a higher perception of risk around Ebola. 
Unfortunately, exposure to these information sources (and other sources, such as radio) was 
also associated with having misconceptions about Ebola and engaging in risk behaviors, but 
these associations were not as strong. Sierra Leonean journalists adopted many different roles 
over the course of the outbreak. From being skeptical about the existence of an outbreak in 
the beginning, to acting like instructors towards the end – giving practical tips about how to 
stay safe, while leaving their journalistic independence behind.  
When a virus spreads, something else tends to spread as well: misinformation. The current 
COVID-19 pandemic and concurrent ‘infodemic’ has made this abundantly clear. Countering 
misinformation is not an easy task, and can sometimes even backfire. The scientific evidence 
on how to best debunk misinformation is quite limited when it comes to health-related 
misinformation. Plus, studies often target misinformation that doesn’t exist in real life, but 
that is made up for the study. In the Contagious Misinformation Trial (Study IV of this 
thesis), real-world misinformation about typhoid in Sierra Leone was targeted, using audio 
dramas that were sent via WhatsApp. The dramas that discussed the misinformation and then 
provided the correct alternative, were more successful in reducing the belief in 
misinformation than the audio dramas that only focused on the correct information.  
Together, the studies show the important role risk communication can play in outbreaks– in 
both a positive and a negative way. It shows that it is vital to provide clear, accurate and 
contextualized information to local journalists and to the general public throughout an 
outbreak. Even though the sheer amount of misinformation in an outbreak might seem 
overwhelming, the results of the Contagious Misinformation Trial give some reason for hope. 
Misinformation can successfully be targeted, ideally by engaging with the misinformation 
and explaining why the correct information is true. Risk communication and debunking 
misinformation can therefore not only help to bring an epidemic under control, but an 
infodemic as well.   
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1 CONTAGIOUS (MIS)COMMUNICATION  
Do you remember where you heard the news of the first confirmed cases of COVID-19 in 
your country? Were you afraid of what would happen? What all of us around the world have 
in common in scary and uncertain situations like these, is that we want to know what is going 
on. Who did you trust for information on COVID-19? On what kind of information did you 
base your decisions? Did you change your behavior, to avoid getting infected?  
Disease outbreaks are exceptional situations and proper risk communication is vital. The 
public needs to know what actions to take to avoid getting infected or infecting others. The 
COVID-19 pandemic, caused by the SARS-CoV-2 virus, was (and still is) marked by a non-
stop flow of breaking news. But alongside this stream of information is an avalanche of 
misinformation.1,2 Questionable theories about the origins of the coronavirus are shared 
widely on social media, just like promotions of untested miracle drugs and treatments. For 
many people living in Europe or the USA, this might be the first real experience with an 
uncontrolled disease outbreak and its (mis)information overload. But for people in Sierra 
Leone it probably brings back vivid memories of misinformation during the Ebola outbreak 
between 2014 and 2016. In the midst of that outbreak, a powerful rumor woke people all over 
Sierra Leone up in the middle of the night. They were urged to get up and immediately wash 
themselves with salt and hot water. By doing so, they would be protected against Ebola.3 
Many people followed the advice, got up and frantically washed themselves. Better safe than 
sorry, right? Indeed, the washing in itself might seem harmless. But the perceived immunity 
to Ebola might have encouraged people to engage in risky behaviors.3 
It is not surprising that misinformation thrives during infectious disease outbreaks.3–5 
Especially the beginning of an outbreak comes with many uncertainties; the mortality rate of 
the disease, the transmissibility, the impact public health measures will have on one’s life. 
Facts are not established yet, and as more data pours in, will be adapted to the newly acquired 
knowledge. Thirst for information cannot be fully quenched with so many unknowns. It 
creates fertile grounds to seed misinformation.6 
How do people make sense of all this (mis)information, and how can they make informed 
decisions? What role does risk communication and misinformation play in infectious disease 
outbreaks? This thesis will dive into this, by analyzing data from the Ebola outbreak and 
through a randomized controlled trial that aimed to counter prevalent misinformation in 





2 EBOLA IN WEST AFRICA 
Meliandou is a small, poor village in Guinea with just 31 houses, surrounded by farmland and 
close to the borders with Liberia and Sierra Leone. It is an unremarkable place normally, but 
received worldwide attention when the first West African Ebola patient was traced back to 
the village.7 Patient zero turned out to most likely be a 2-year old boy who fell ill with an – at 
the time – mysterious disease, accompanied by fever, black stools and vomiting.8 It killed 
him four days later, on the sixth of December 2013. Just 50 meters from where little Emile 
and his family used to live, stood a large hollow tree. Emile loved to play in the tree with his 
friends, trying to catch the bats that lived in it. It is believed, although conclusive evidence is 
still lacking, that one of those insectivorous bats infected Emile with Ebola.7 Emile in turn 
infected his 3-year old sister, his mother and his grandmother – all of whom died.9 A village 
nurse and midwife succumbed to Ebola in January 2014. Family members attending the 
victims’ funerals in Meliandou similarly fell ill and died, taking the virus with them to their 
own villages. The virus kept spreading. By the end of January 2014, a medical alert was sent 
to district health officials about cases of fatal diarrhea.10 But it was not until mid-March 2014 
that Guinea’s Ministry of Health sounded the alarm bells over a mysterious disease. Ten days 
later, the WHO officially declared an Ebola outbreak.10 By then, the virus was already 
spreading in Conakry, Guinea’s capital. An uncontrolled, rapidly expanding outbreak in one 
of the world’s poorest regions. A recipe for disaster.  
Before the West African outbreak, Ebola outbreaks were largely confined to a few countries 
in central and east Africa; mainly Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), 
Gabon and South Sudan.11 It owes its name to the Ebola river close to where the first known 
outbreak was described in the DRC in 1976.11 Until the West African outbreak started in 
2014, more than 20 other outbreaks have been described. The largest of which was in 
Uganda’s Gulu, where 425 people contracted the disease and 224 patients died of it. 11 The 
deadliest outbreak until 2014 was the very first outbreak in the DRC, where 318 people got 
infected and 280 people lost their lives to Ebola. 11  
It is up to today unknown where in nature the Ebola virus hides – the natural reservoir of the 
virus has still not been confirmed. However, it is widely believed that bats host the virus, and 
that through handling or eating an infected bat, or fruits that have been partially eaten by bats, 
the virus could spill over to humans.12–15 This is what likely happened to Emile in Meliandou. 
After the first spillover to humans, the West African Ebola outbreak continued spreading 
through human-to-human transmission. Infection can only happen through direct contact with 
blood, secretions, organs or other bodily fluids of infected people, through broken skin or 
contact with mucous membranes.13–15 Surfaces or materials (like bedding or clothes) can also 
be contaminated with the virus.16 Because of their potential contact with bodily fluids from 
Ebola patients, healthcare workers are at an increased risk of contracting the disease.17 Health 
centers taking care of Ebola patients should therefore be equipped with isolation units and 




In theory, to stop Ebola transmission, Ebola patients need to be isolated and people should 
simply avoid touching them (or do so using PPE). In reality, this proved to be an enormous 
challenge. When Emile fell ill in December 2013, it happened in a region where Ebola had 
never appeared before: West Africa. The virus strain that made him sick also happened to be 
the deadliest of the five known strains: the Zaire ebolavirus strain.10 Previous Ebola outbreaks 
mostly occurred in rural areas, which made them easier to control. The fact that Ebola was 
spreading in the urban settings of Conakry in March 2014, was reason for alarm.  
Unfortunately, the fragile health system in Guinea was unable to bring the outbreak under 
control. Just one week after the WHO officially declared the Ebola outbreak, the first two 
cases were reported in Liberia’s Lofa county,18 close to the border with Guinea. Early April, 
21 Ebola cases were reported, with 10 deaths – one of them in Liberia’s capital Monrovia. 
While many people feared an explosive outbreak at this point, it looked like the outbreak was 
under control. Very few new cases were reported in the weeks that followed, until the 
outbreak gained traction in Monrovia in June.18 
In the meantime, people in Sierra Leone held their breath while case counts of Ebola went up 
in neighboring Guinea and Liberia. It was not until May 2014 that Sierra Leone reported its 
first cases, which could later be traced back to the funeral of a traditional healer in the 
Kailahun district, an area in the east of Sierra Leone, close to the border with Guinea and 
Liberia.19,20 Ebola patients from Guinea crossed the border to Sierra Leone, hoping to be 
treated by her. The traditional healer fell ill with Ebola herself, and subsequently died of it. 
She was a well-known healer in the region and her funeral was visited by hundreds of people 
from Sierra Leone and Guinea. Ebola spread freely among the mourners – it is now estimated 
that as many as 365 Ebola deaths could be linked to that funeral.20,21 
2.1 SUPER SPREADERS 
It would not be the last time a funeral turned out to be a super spreader event in the West 
African Ebola outbreak.12,22,23 The viral load of an Ebola patient is highest around the time of 
death. Even after someone dies of Ebola, the body still sheds the virus.14,15 Because burial 
practices in West Africa commonly involve washing and touching the body of the deceased, 
funerals formed high-risk events during the outbreak.12 The burial of the traditional healer in 
Sierra Leone’s Kailahun was an extreme case. Other unsafe burials have resulted in 30 new 
cases in Sierra Leone and more than 60 in Guinea.22,23 It is estimated that on average, every 
unsafe burial in West Africa caused three new Ebola cases.24 
Apart from funerals, taking care of Ebola patients increased the risk of Ebola transmission, 
both in Ebola Treatment Units (ETUs) and at home.25 It is difficult to avoid touching an 
Ebola patient or their clothes and bedding when living in small, poor households shared with 
many family members. Despite the recommendation to stay away from an Ebola patient, 
family members often felt an immediate need to take care of their loved one.26 While during 
the outbreak, people were encouraged to seek medical care in ETUs, these centers did not 
always have enough capacity.26 Many people feared and distrusted the ETUs and families of 
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hospitalized patients were stigmatized by their communities.26–28 The distrust, especially in 
the first months of the outbreak, and the overwhelmed response system, made that people 
often took care of their loved one at home – posing a great risk for further infections.26,28 
In health facilities, the situation was dire as well, especially in the first months of the 
outbreak.29 The lack of clear standard operating procedures in health facilities, shortage of 
PPE and hand washing facilities, and delayed laboratory diagnosis of Ebola cases all 
contributed to unsafe surroundings where Ebola could easily spread.29–31 One study looking 
at Ebola cases between May and October 2014 in Sierra Leone, estimated that the risk of 
contracting Ebola was more than 100 times higher for healthcare workers (HCWs) than non-
HCWs.30 
After getting in contact with infectious fluids, it takes between 2 to 21 days to develop Ebola 
symptoms – most patients fall ill between 5-9 days after exposure to the virus.14,32 Ebola 
patients can only transmit the virus when they have symptoms of the disease, which usually 
starts with a sudden onset of fever, muscle pain, headache and a sore throat. Later on, this is 
accompanied by vomiting, diarrhea, rash and impaired kidney and liver functions.13 
Hemorrhage, often depicted in the media and in movies as the key symptom of Ebola, was 
only reported in about 18% of Ebola cases.33 Symptoms such as fever, headache and muscle 
ache are common for other diseases such as malaria, typhoid and meningitis – diseases that 
are endemic to Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia.13 Ebola infection therefore needs to be 
confirmed through diagnostic tests, whereby blood samples of suspected Ebola cases should 
be collected and tested in laboratories.34,35 
At the start of the West African Ebola outbreak, there was no licensed treatment available.36 
Therefore, all that could be given to patients was mere supportive care. This mainly involved 
oral or intravenous rehydration and electrolytes. Often, drugs to reduce vomiting and diarrhea 
and to treat fever and pain were administered.36 
2.2 CURBING AN OUTBREAK 
Given its mode of transmission, the main way to prevent infection is to avoid contact with 
bodily fluids or items that have come in contact with bodily fluids of an Ebola patient.14 
Furthermore, one should not attend burial rituals that involve touching or washing a dead 
body and avoid contact with semen of an Ebola survivor, as it has been shown that the virus 
can survive in immune privileged sites like testes for more than a year after recovery.37 Since 
Ebola outbreaks have been reported among nonhuman primates, it is advisable to stay away 
from these animals and to avoid consuming their meat.38,39 The same goes for bats, as they 
are suspected to be the reservoir of the Ebola virus.39 
But in order to curb an ongoing outbreak, more needs to be done. A multidisciplinary 
approach to the outbreak response is needed.15 This involves early case detection, rapid 
isolation, contact tracing, safe clinical management of Ebola patients, safe and dignified 
burials and health promotion and community engagement.15 Early case detection is crucial, as 
this lowers the risk of further spread of the virus in the community. Safe care of patients 
 
 17 
should ideally be done in specialized ETUs, to minimize the risk of transmission within 
hospital settings.29 
All these measures work very well on paper.  
In the setting of a real and deadly epidemic, prevention and control measures are not as 
straightforward. The West African Ebola outbreak made this painfully clear. Because Ebola 
surfaced in one of the poorest parts of the world, health systems were fragile and 
governments were unable to adequately address the threat they were facing.40 In countries 
where there are only 2-9 doctors per 100.000 people (to compare: Sweden has around 400 
doctors per 100.000 people),41 safe clinical management, early case detection and contact 
tracing was not feasible without support from the international community.  
Another factor hampering the response was widespread fear.27,42,43 Fear quickly spread 
around the world, fed by horrific images of the situation on the ground.42,43 However, the 
existence of the outbreak was in the first months largely denied in Sierra Leone, Guinea and 
Liberia.40,44 Trying to make the public understand the reality and the severity of the disease, 
the main risk communication messages in the first months stated that ‘Ebola is real, Ebola has 
no cure’.40,45 Hearing that the disease had no cure rightfully terrified people. They feared not 
only the virus, but the entire response to it. Adding deep-seeded mistrust and viral rumors to 
that mix, made people hide infected family members, and bury their deceased loved ones 
secretly.27,42,46 Risk communication and community engagement proved to be a very difficult 
task.  
It was against this backdrop that the Ebola outbreak quickly spiraled out of control in 2014 in 
Sierra Leone, Guinea and Liberia. By July 2014, Ebola cases were reported in the capital 
cities of all three countries.10 Case numbers grew exponentially between June and September 
2014; the national case numbers in Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia doubled between 16 and 
30 days (see figure 1).47 While the outbreak was accelerating, the international response came 
off to a slow start. The WHO has been widely criticized for not declaring a Public Health 
Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) earlier – it was finally done on August 8, 




Figure 1. Weekly number of Ebola cases in Sierra Leone, Guinea and Liberia (based on data from CDC50) 
In September 2014, the United Nations Mission for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER) 
was created. Its strategy to combat the outbreak had five action points:40 
1. Stop the outbreak 
2. Treat the infected 
3. Ensure essential services 
4. Preserve stability 
5. Prevent further outbreaks 
These action points indicate the medical focus of the international response. It was believed 
that the outbreak would be curbed by increasing the number of isolation units, beds and 
health workers.40 What was clearly absent from this strategy was community engagement and 
risk communication.40,45 
2.3 RISK COMMUNICATION AND SOCIAL MOBILIZATION 
The WHO’s toolkit for behavioral and social communication in outbreak response 
acknowledges that communication strategies are often not available in the beginning of an 
outbreak and are often outside operational decision making.51 Still, the WHO recognizes the 
importance of risk communication and community engagement in outbreak situations, 
naming it an ‘integral pillar of an outbreak response’.51 In previous Ebola outbreaks in 






























Mar  Apr  May   June  July  Aug  Sept Oct  Nov  Dec   Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May  June   July   Aug   Sept  Oct
Months 2014-2015     
 
 19 
Definitions of risk communication and community engagement 
The WHO defines risk communication as ’the real-time exchange of information, 
advice and opinions between experts, community leaders or officials and the people 
who are at risk’53 
Community engagement is defined by UNICEF as: ’processes of engaging and 
motivating a wide range of partners and allies at national and local levels to raise 
awareness of and demand for a particular development objective through 
dialogue’54 
When communities face a deadly threat, they often develop their own protocols for disease 
control, for instance through isolating sick community members.52 During the 2000-2001 
Ebola outbreak in Gulu, Uganda, communities had protocols in place to isolate sick 
community members in a house that was at least 100 meters away from all other houses.52 By 
mapping and understanding these kinds of community-level practices, (inter)national 
response activities can be developed so that they are aligned with ongoing practices.52 This 
can enhance community ownership and be beneficial for everybody involved. 45,53,55 
Mathematical models point to the important role that risk communication can play in an 
outbreak.56,57 These models usually start with the premise that information campaigns 
influence the knowledge of the public, which in turn could influence behavior.56,57 Good and 
accurate reporting could slow down the initial phase of an outbreak and could lower the 
number of cases during the peak of an outbreak. Inaccurate reporting on the other hand, could 
lead to an increase in the number of cases.56 Another model, based on an influenza outbreak, 
concluded that awareness and knowledge is attributable to a wide availability of information 
– highlighting ‘the crucial role of mass media and educational campaigns’ during an 
epidemic.57 Modeling studies however, are inherently limited in their external validity, as 
they represent an ideal, standardized situation and will never be better than the variables 
included in the model.58 
There are several guidelines for effective risk communication in health emergencies.53,59 The 
Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication (CERC) principles for instance, highlight that 
different communication techniques are needed in different phases of an outbreak.59 In the 
initial phase, focus should be on the reduction of uncertainty around the risk, as well as 
promotion of self-efficacy through recommended practices that can be taken up by the public. 
As the outbreak continues, more information about the risks and protective behaviors are 
likely known and should be communicated accordingly in the maintenance phase.59,60 The 
WHO emphasizes the importance of building trust with affected communities, so that 
communities can be effectively engaged in risk communication.53 Risk communication often 
aims to inform the public, so that they in turn can make informed decisions regarding the 
adoption of protective behaviors and the avoidance of risk behaviors.61 
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Unfortunately, even with proper risk communication and an informed public, behavior 
change is not easily achieved – a phenomenon that is also called the ‘knowledge-behavior 
gap’.62–65 The Health Belief Model (HBM), one of the most applied models of health 
behavior change, shows that several, modifiable determinants are important to consider:66,67 
• the perceived barriers and benefits of the new behavior 
• the perceived seriousness of and susceptibility to the disease 
• one’s self-efficacy  
Cues to action are needed to stimulate people to act upon the perceived benefits and threats. 
Applying the HBM to risk communication in the Ebola outbreak in West Africa, shows that 
conveying the severity of an Ebola infection, not only for the affected persons, but also the 
family, might have increased the perceived threat. It can be argued that while the message 
‘Ebola has no cure’ might have increased the level of perceived threat, at the same time it also 
decreased the level of self-efficacy. It conveyed severity, but also hopelessness.  
People’s perceived susceptibility to a disease threat is also known as risk perception. WHO’s 
risk communication guidelines assign an especially important role to the public’s risk 
perception, saying that ‘risk perception is the primary predictor for disaster prevention and 
mitigation behaviors’.53 Various characteristics of a threat can determine how the public 
perceives the risk. For instance, if a threat is new to the public and has the potential to be 
fatal, it is likely that the public will have a high perception of risk.68,69 Similarly, risk 
perception will be higher when the threat came involuntarily and is perceived to be beyond 
the public’s control.68,69 The Ebola outbreak ticked all of those boxes.  
According to the Social Amplification of Risk Framework, risk perception can be heightened 
or attenuated by social, psychological and cultural processes.70 Communication is important 
in this framework, through interpersonal communication and the news media.70 However, the 
focus of news media is commonly on the unexpected, unusual and dramatic stories, which in 
itself can amplify perceptions of risk. A study analyzing news coverage of the West African 
Ebola outbreak in the United States - a country where 11 Ebola patients were treated - found 
that 96% of all news stories contained at least one message that could be considered risk-
elevating.71 On the other hand, only 55% of the news stories had at least one message that 
was risk-minimizing.71 
Journalists are important actors in the framing of news and messages. Agenda-setting theory 
poses that journalists filter what is happening, and by doing so, focus on core issues while 
ignoring others.72,73 By making the core issues more salient, the public can perceive those as 
more important than other stories. Over time, these issues can be become part of the agenda 
of the public as well.72,73 
According to the theories outlined above, how messages are framed and which messages are 
highlighted, can all have an influence on people’s knowledge, perception of risk and 
potentially their behaviors.66–68,70,72,73 In Sierra Leone, the message ‘Ebola has no cure’ also 
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had various effects on the public: it increased people’s perception of risk, but also decreased 
their self-efficacy. And it led to people avoiding health centers.28,45 Given the perceived 
inevitable death (i.e. high perceptions of risk associated with ETUs), people preferred to die 
at home surrounded by their loved ones, instead of going to a health center.28 Other public 
health messages had the problem that they did not align with reality. Encouraging people to 
call an ambulance for instance, is of little value when there are no ambulances available.40,74 
Furthermore, messages often created more questions than answers. When telling people not 
to touch a sick person, family members wondered how to take care of their sick loved 
ones.26,75 With a focus on top-down communication, there was little room for people to ask 
their questions.76 
2.4 KICK EBOLA OUT OF SIERRA LEONE 
While the international response to the outbreak did not clearly prioritize community 
engagement, the Government of Sierra Leone (GoSL) founded a Social Mobilization Pillar in 
June 2014. It brought together more than 100 stakeholders, from non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) to ministries, to the US Centers of Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) and UNICEF.74 
A national communication strategy followed in September.46 The strategy was informed by 
results from a nationwide Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices (KAP) survey, that was carried 
out in August 2014.46 The strategy emphasized the importance of dialogue in communication, 
enabling people to express concerns – a sharp contrast to the international UNMEER 
response. The messaging guide that was created based on the empirical evidence, focused on 
protective behaviors.3,77 
Examples of risk communication messages from the Message Guide77 
Celebrate survivors 
‘People who survive Ebola need hope and social support from family, friends and 
the community. We must honor those who have survived Ebola! We are all Ebola 
fighters!’ 
The fight is not over 
‘The Ebola outbreak is not over. We cannot relax our guard just because we are 
seeing signs of progress. We must continue to work together to defeat this disease 
until we get to zero.’ 
The results of the KAP survey further revealed that the large majority of the respondents 
(88%) received updates about Ebola via the radio3 – one of the most accessible media 
platforms in a country where almost half of the adult population is illiterate.78 Because of the 
importance of radio in Sierra Leone, efforts were made to train Sierra Leonean journalists on 
essential facts about the virus,79 supported by BBC Media Action and the CDC. Radio 
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stations were organized in networks and aligned their programming so that the same 
messages were amplified across the country. The customized programs ‘Kick Ebola Out Of 
Sierra Leone’ and ‘Kick Ebola Live’ reached national audiences through these networks.79 
Using the power of their medium, radio stations would host people from the community – 
from health workers and local leaders to Ebola survivors. It was made interactive by allowing 
listeners to call in with their questions and concerns.79 
Religious leaders similarly played an important communication role during the outbreak. In 
Sierra Leone, a country where 78% of the population is Muslim and 21% is Christian,80 
religion and religious leaders are ingrained in society.81 Religious leaders were engaged to 
develop faith-based messages, specifically to target unsafe burial practices that sparked 
further Ebola infections.82,83 Safe burials meant that deceased patients should be buried within 
24 hours after death, and that burials should be carried out by trained teams wearing 
appropriate PPE.83 In reality, many Ebola victims were often buried in unmarked graves, 
frequently with other bodies – a practice that was unacceptable to the public.83 Furthermore, 
family members were not able to observe the burial and feared that the bodies were not 
handled appropriately.84 It led to people burying their loved ones themselves, exposing them 
to the virus. Facing these obstacles, the safe and dignified burial protocols from the WHO and 
the GoSL that were developed in the second half of 2014, incorporated religious and cultural 
elements.85,86 Religious leaders were engaged and identified passages in the Quran and the 
Bible that highlighted the importance of safe burials in exceptional situations such as an 
Ebola outbreak.87,88 Furthermore, religious leaders were encouraged to give support to 
bereaved families and to give final prayers.89 An analysis (currently in preprint) of a cross-
sectional population-based KAP survey in December 2014 showed that people exposed to 
faith-based messages were significantly more accepting of safe burials.90  
In September 2014 and March 2015, house-to-house campaigns were initiated by the GoSL. 
During the three-day campaigns, households were visited by health workers to discuss Ebola 
and active case searching was intensified.91 There were many other community interventions 
over the course of the outbreak in Sierra Leone, most notably the engagement of traditional 
healers, who agreed to suspend their practices until the outbreak was over.92,93 
Engaging communities in the response was an important step in making people understand 
the reality of the outbreak and increasing people’s trust in response measures.76,94 In an 
evaluation of the lessons learned from the outbreak, Sierra Leone’s National Ebola Response 
Centre noted that the involvement of communities and local leaders helped to build trust and 
collaboration.95 Furthermore, improved quality of care, seeing survivors, and hearing 
messages that were in line with reality all contributed towards accepting control 
measures.94,96 Taken together, community engagement and risk communication likely helped, 
together with the biomedical approach, to bring the outbreak to an end.45,97–99 
While Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea were the epicenters of the world’s largest Ebola 
outbreak in history, the virus spread to three other West African countries: Senegal, Mali and 
Nigeria.10 There were fears of a large outbreak in Nigeria when the virus was discovered in 
 
 23 
the crowded urban areas of Lagos. However, intense outbreak measures such as contact 
tracing, isolation of patients and risk communication brought the outbreak quickly under 
control. A total of 19 laboratory confirmed cases and 8 deaths were recorded in Nigeria.100 
Outside of West Africa, various European countries treated Ebola patients on their soils.10,101 
In the USA, 11 patients were treated, 4 of whom became ill after arrival in the country, and 
one of them died.10 
 
 
An early community engagement success story 
Text adapted from chapter ‘Community responses to Ebola’ in ‘Ebola: How a people’s science helped end an 
epidemic’ by Paul Richards102 
The first cluster of Ebola cases in Sierra Leone started in the east of the country, in 
Kailahun, in the chiefdom of Jawei. The paramount chief of Jawei, Chief Musa 
Kallon, was a trained nurse and knew about the dangers of Ebola. Unfortunately, he 
was in Freetown for meetings on the day the first Ebola case was confirmed in his 
chiefdom. He tried warning his wife and daughter not to visit the patient – but he 
was too late. His wife was a childhood friend of the Ebola patient and she visited 
her in the health center. Shortly thereafter, Chief Kallon’s wife became ill herself 
and died. Their daughter, taking care of her mother, was the next victim. Chief 
Kallon quickly instituted by-laws in his chiefdom to limit the spread of the virus, 
for instance by not allowing visitors to stay overnight and encouraging people to 
stay home. He created a task force to carry out contact tracing and safe burials – 
before any official guidelines about safe burials were created. As often as he could, 
he talked on the radio about the dangers of Ebola. The biggest hurdle he had to 
overcome was the persistent denial about Ebola. Many people believed Ebola was 
a political scam designed to reduce the number of voters in their area, which was 
supportive of the (at the time) political opposition. Chief Kallon was a friend of the 
president, and therefore suspected to be involved in the scam. But Chief Kallon 
persisted with his task force and together managed to convince the community 
about the reality of Ebola, breaking the transmission and bringing the outbreak to 
an end in his chiefdom. Cases and deaths started to decline before a major 
international response was mounted. It was a community-led response, which 






2.5 THE AFTERMATH 
The West African Ebola outbreak was officially declared over on March 29, 2016 when the 
WHO lifted the PHEIC status.10 More than 28,600 cases were reported in the three most 
affected countries, with more than 11,000 deaths. Sierra Leone accounted for almost half of 
the Ebola cases, and almost 4,000 citizens reportedly lost their lives.49 The health sector in 
Sierra Leone was heavily affected as well: 79 HCWs had died in the outbreak, corresponding 
to 7% of the total healthcare workforce.103 Due to the severely reduced availability of health 
services for diseases other than Ebola, it is estimated that an additional 2,800 people in Sierra 
Leone died from malaria, HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis.104 Education was disrupted and 
teenage pregnancies went up by at least 25%.105 Aside from the enormous toll on health and 
the health system, the outbreak also had severe consequences for Sierra Leone’s economy. In 
2014, there was an estimated 10% loss in exports, and the production of staple crops fell by 
12%.106,107 The price tag for external donors was hefty as well; the USA alone spent an 
estimated 3.3 billion USD on the West African outbreak response.108 
Those who survived an Ebola infection continued to face numerous challenges, both 
psychologically and physically. An unknown share of survivors reportedly suffered from 
post-Ebola syndrome, with complaints ranging from musculoskeletal pains, joint pain, 
headaches and visual problems to extreme fatigue, depression and decreased libido.109–113 
Survivors also faced stigma when returning home, mostly because of community fears that 
survivors can still transmit Ebola.114 This fear and the related stigma was even higher when 
survivors suffered from post-Ebola syndrome.115 The finding that the virus can survive more 
than a year in semen further fueled fears.37 A nationwide KAP survey conducted in August 
2014 in Sierra Leone found that as many as 95% of the respondents held at least one 
stigmatizing belief or attitude about Ebola survivors, for instance that they would not accept a 
survivor back into their communities, or avoid buying vegetables from a shopkeeper who 
survived Ebola.3 These stigmatizing beliefs made that some survivors were evicted from their 
homes, were socially isolated and were abandoned and divorced by their partners.116–118 In a 
survey among 358 survivors in Sierra Leone, 83% reported signs of internalized stigma – 
having feelings of shame or guilt due to being an Ebola survivor.116  
Over the course of the outbreak, the development of Ebola vaccines accelerated. Especially in 
Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone, various trials were conducted with thousands of 
participants to test the efficacy of newly developed vaccine candidates.119–123 In December 
2019, the first Ebola vaccine (rVSV-ZEBOV) was officially approved by the U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration.124,125 
2.6 MORE EBOLA OUTBREAKS 
Since the end of the West African Ebola outbreak, the virus has re-emerged three times, in 
different regions of the DRC. The outbreak that started in May 2018 in the Équateur province 
was brought under control relatively quickly, with the last cases reported in July 2018. A total 
of 54 people became infected, 33 of them died.126,127 At the time, the rVSV-ZEBOV vaccine 
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was not licensed yet, but was granted ‘compassionate use’ in the DRC and was administered 
to contacts of infected people and health workers. More than 3,000 people received the 
vaccine during the three months of the outbreak.127 
Unfortunately, there was not much time to celebrate the swift end of this outbreak. Just one 
month later, in August 2018, another unrelated outbreak was detected in the DRC – this time 
in the conflict-ridden province of North Kivu, where Ebola had never emerged before. The 
politically instable and at times violent region proved to be a challenge of another order. Two 
thirds of respondents of a survey held in September 2018 indicated that they did not think the 
local authorities represented their interests.4 Another 25% did not believe Ebola was real, 
even when the outbreak had been going on for more than a month.4 The low trust was 
associated with a decreased likelihood of adopting protective behaviors.4 Violent attacks on 
ETUs continued to undermine the response and the outbreak spread to the neighboring 
provinces South Kivu and Ituri.128,129 Despite an effective vaccine, given to more than 
300,000 people, it took almost 2 years to get the outbreak under control.130 In 2020, another 
Ebola outbreak smoldered for almost six months in the DRC, this time in the Mbandaka area 
of the Équateur province.131 After 130 confirmed and probable cases, 55 deaths and a vaccine 
administered to more than 40,000 people, this outbreak was declared over in November 
2020.131  
More than anything, the ‘epidemic of suspicion’, as a health worker from Médecins sans 
Frontières called the North Kivu outbreak, shows how important it is that the at-risk 
population trusts the response efforts.128 Even with more focus on risk communication and 
community engagement in the North Kivu outbreak and the use of an effective vaccine,132. 
trust and community empowerment do not seem to follow a step-by-step manual. There is 




3 MISINFORMATION  
Despite risk communication guidelines and best practices, health emergencies such as disease 
outbreaks are often accompanied by a surge in misinformation, likely resulting from unmet 
information needs of the public.133 In the North Kivu Ebola outbreak, misinformation was 
widespread, with sometimes deadly consequences. Together with distrust in authorities and 
international responders, it led to attacks on ETUs, killing and injuring HCWs.134 During the 
international Zika outbreak in 2016, rumors went around that Zika was not the cause of 
microcephaly, but that a larvicide caused the disability.135,136 Similarly, blame was placed on 
vaccines distributed by the Brazilian government.136,137 
 
Figure 2: Definitions of Misinformation and Disinformation, modified from Derakshan & Wardle139 
What is misinformation? 
Misinformation is defined as false information.139 The difference between 
misinformation and disinformation lies in the intention to cause harm or to mislead 
with the incorrect information, see figure 2.139,140 In misinformation, there is no 
intention to cause harm or to mislead, while this intention is present in 
disinformation. Fabricated material, or intentionally created conspiracies are a form 
of disinformation. Wrong information can start as disinformation, for instance by 
somebody who created a conspiracy theory.141 This same information however, can 
also be classified as misinformation when it is shared by people who believe this is 
correct information. Because often the intention of spreading false information is 
not known, this thesis classifies all false information as misinformation.  
Disinformation







such as inaccurate photo 
captions, dates, statistics, 
translations, or when 
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Even as far back as the 1918 influenza pandemic, which took place towards the end of World 
War I, misinformation and downplaying the danger of the virus led to prioritizing military 
parades over public health in the USA.138 Philadelphia’s mayor Krusen felt it would 
undermine the spirit of war to cancel the largest parade in the history of the city because of a 
looming epidemic. He decided to let the festivities go ahead as planned. Just days later, 
hospitals were overflowing, and he had to admit that there was now widespread community 
transmission of the dreaded influenza virus.138  
Fast forward to 2020, the coronavirus pandemic. Not since the 1918 pandemic has the whole 
world been affected by a virus. SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes the disease COVID-19, 
spread around the world in a matter of months. Border closures, societal lockdowns and 
social distancing have become the new normal in many parts of the world. Very different 
from the 1918 pandemic is the current media landscape, whereby online and social media 
bring us breaking news in a matter of seconds. Furthermore, thanks to social media, 
misinformation proliferates and spreads at a higher speed than the virus itself. Pointing to the 
overflow of information and misinformation around the coronavirus, the WHO has dubbed it 
an ‘infodemic’.142,143 Misinformation has been around since mankind, but social media and 
the increased media fractionation have created echo chambers and information silos that can 
potentially amplify misinformation.144–146 An analysis of true and false information on 
Twitter found that false information spreads six times faster than correct information.146 False 
information also spreads farther and more broadly than correct information.146  
Still, there are striking similarities between the 1918 pandemic and the coronavirus pandemic. 
In 1918, mayor Krusen allowed a super spreader event to take place, ignoring public health 
experts.138 In 2020, the US president Donald Trump has consistently undermined the severity 
of the pandemic and called for states to reopen their economies - a stark increase in the 
number of COVID-19 cases followed in June and July 2020.147 
Not all misinformation poses direct harm to people, because not all misinformation influences 
important protective behaviors.148,149 For instance, during the West African Ebola outbreak, 
some people believed that witchcraft played a role in the spread of the virus.150 Whereas this 
is from a biomedical point of view not true, the belief was harmless if people would still stop 
attending unsafe burials. Believing that injecting bleach will help prevent you from 
contracting COVID-19, as suggested by president Trump, clearly has a dangerous behavioral 
aspect. Before any efforts are made to counter misinformation, behavioral consequences of 
the misinformation should ideally be determined.  
Vaccines and vaccination programs are known targets of misinformation, which in turn has 
influenced attitudes towards vaccination and health behaviors. The resulting vaccine 
hesitancy is a multifaceted, complex and growing problem on a global scale.151–153 Hesitancy 
towards vaccines is not binary, but should be placed on a continuum, whereby some people 
receive all vaccinations despite concerns, others delay or refuse some vaccines. Highly 
vaccine hesitant people might refuse vaccination altogether.154–156 Misinformation has likely 
also contributed to the changed perceptions of risk around vaccines, whereby the risks of 
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adverse health outcomes associated with a disease are considered smaller than the risks 
associated with vaccination.153 One of the most well-known examples of the impact of 
misinformation on vaccine uptake concerns the (non-existing) link between the measles 
vaccine and autism. This link was reported by Wakefield et al. in the Lancet in 1998, but the 
paper turned out to be based on fraudulent data and was fully retracted in 2010.157 
Unfortunately, very vocal, online anti-vaccination campaigners keep spreading this false 
information and urge parents not to have their children immunized. Despite countless studies 
proving that there is no link with autism,158–160 so-called ‘anti-vaxxers’ are not slowing down 
in their quest. The vaccine coverage in general is still high, but has declined slightly in 
several European countries and in the USA over the last years, leading to several measles 
outbreaks.161,162 HCWs are increasingly confronted by their patients with misinformation and 
often have difficulties in accurately and effectively communicating around vaccines.163–165 To 
add to the complexity, a systematic review of various interventions that aimed to target 
parental vaccine hesitancy found that the effect of information and education interventions 
was limited.166 Finding ways to counter misinformation has never been more urgent. 
3.1 YOU’RE WRONG 
In the context of epidemics, misinformation is especially likely to spread in the initial phases 
of an outbreak. The CERC guidelines therefore also highlight that misinformation should be 
actively targeted early on.59,60 In the fields of political science, psychology and climate 
science, there have been numerous scientific efforts to find effective ways to counter 
misinformation. Unfortunately, these efforts have had limited success and can sometimes 
even induce a so-called ‘backfire’ effect, whereby the belief in misinformation is 
inadvertently enhanced.140  
One of the very clear findings across all investigations in this field, is that simply saying 
‘you’re wrong’ when you hear misinformation, is not likely to change people’s minds.167,168 
This commonly happens because there is no replacement for the misinformation, leaving a 
gap in people’s understanding. When no alternative is given, what else should someone 
believe when he or she is told that the information is wrong? In absence of an alternative, 
people instead tend to keep relying on the misinformation.140,169 A clear example of this 
comes from a study whereby participants were asked to read a fictitious story about a fire in a 
warehouse, which alleged that the fire was caused by materials that were stored in a closet.170 
Participants were then told that the closet had actually been empty, but no alternative about 
the cause of the fire was provided. Despite remembering the correction of the misinformation, 
up to 95% of participants still relied on the misinformation. The authors of the study coined 
this the ‘continued influence effect’.170 This effect is especially pronounced when no clear 
alternative or explanation is given.140,145,171 
3.2 DEBUNKING 
Strategies to debunk (or counter) misinformation therefore usually rely on providing an 
alternative to the misinformation. Meta-analyses investigating the effect size of debunking 
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strategies found that factors such as the credibility of the source, explanations that are in line 
with people’s existing worldviews and social norms, as well as repetition of the correct 
information all have the potential to enhance the chance of successful debunking.167,168  
Unfortunately, even when alternatives are provided, well-intentioned health messages can 
still backfire. In a survey experiment in the USA, aiming to test the effectiveness of messages 
to reduce misconceptions about the measles vaccine, parents were assigned to receive 
information, textual or visual, about the safety of the vaccine or the dangers of measles.172 
Textual information reduced the belief in misinformation, but also decreased the self-reported 
intent to vaccinate.172 Furthermore, the images of children sick with measles actually 
increased the belief that the vaccine causes autism.172 A meta-analysis looking into these 
types of fear appeal messages concluded that they run a risk of backfiring, especially when 
they are not accompanied by messages to increase someone’s self-efficacy.173 Similar results 
have been reported in an online study aiming to counter misinformation about the measles 
vaccine, using debunking strategies such as ‘myths vs facts’ and ‘visual correction’, whereby 
participants saw a visualization of the risks of vaccines versus the risks of measles, as well as 
a ‘fear correction’, showing pictures of unvaccinated children that contracted measles.174 
None of the strategies reduced misconceptions or increased the intention to vaccinate 
compared to the control group. At the same time, the fear correction approach actually 
strengthened the belief that vaccines cause autism.174 Fortunately, recent findings show that 
the backfire effect does not seem to happen as often as once feared.140,175 
But even when debunking efforts do not backfire, there are other hurdles. A trial among staff 
at autism centers in Australia aimed to decrease the support for non-evidence-based autism 
therapies, while at the same time enhancing support for proven therapies.176 The study found 
that support for non-evidence-based therapies significantly decreased in the intervention 
group, whereas the support for proven therapies did not change. These effects were not 
sustained over time however, showing that more needs to be done to make the debunking 
effect stick over time.176 
To understand why debunking misinformation is so difficult, it is useful to look at mental 
models. When people are confronted with new information, they build a situational model 
around it – a representation of the information in the circumstances it was encountered.177 
This mental model is relatively flexible and can be adapted to new information, but only if 
the changes to the original model are not too large.178 When the new information is too 
different to fit into the existing mental model, there is a conflict, or ‘cognitive dissonance’.179 
Should you discard the old model and create a new one? Or stick to the old model and discard 
the new information? Unfortunately, we humans are often not very good at assimilating to the 
new information, so we are more likely to keep relying on the old information, even when 
clear alternatives to the misinformation are provided172,174,176 – another expression of the 
previously mentioned continued influence effect.180  
Another concern is that by debunking, attention is placed on the misinformation – which by 
itself can increase the familiarity with the misinformation and strengthen the belief in it.181,182 
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Furthermore, by repeating the misinformation, it could also reach people who would 
otherwise not have heard of it, thus inadvertently spreading the misinformation.183 An 
alternative method of debunking is therefore to not mention the misinformation at all and 
instead to only focus on the correct information.145,184 By consistently repeating the correct 
information, familiarity is increased, which is an important determinant of accepting the 
information as true.145,185,186  
To date, the large majority of published evidence comes from online survey experiments that 
investigate the effectiveness of debunking strategies on constructed misinformation – i.e. 
misinformation that participants have not been exposed to before the study.167,187–190 Few 
studies have looked into countering real-world health-related misinformation.172,174,176 
Furthermore, evidence of the effectiveness of debunking real-world misinformation in low-
income settings is lacking.  
3.3 RATIONALE 
Risk communication and community engagement interventions were incorporated in the 
response to the West African Ebola outbreak. However, the influence of these interventions 
on the public’s knowledge, behaviors and risk perception have not been thoroughly 
investigated with empirical data. In infectious disease outbreaks, misinformation can quickly 
arise and spread, and potentially hamper response efforts. To date, the evidence on countering 
real-world misinformation around infectious diseases is lacking, especially in low-income 
settings. The studies in this thesis contribute to this knowledge gap by investigating the role 
of risk communication on the public’s knowledge, behaviors and risk perception, as well as 
through understanding the perceived roles of Sierra Leonean journalists during the Ebola 
outbreak. Furthermore, the effectiveness of debunking strategies was tested on real-world 
infectious disease misinformation in Sierra Leone. Taken together, the findings of the studies 






The overall aim is to determine the role of risk communication in the Ebola outbreak in Sierra 
Leone and to test the effectiveness of methods to debunk misinformation about infectious 
diseases.  
4.1 SPECIFIC AIMS 
The specific aims of the four sub-studies are:  
I. To determine the relation between exposure to different types of information 
sources and Ebola-specific knowledge and behavior 
II. To determine the relation between risk perception and exposure to different types 
of information sources, Ebola-specific knowledge and behavior 
III. To understand the perspectives and roles of journalists who reported during the 
Ebola outbreak 
IV. To test the effectiveness of two communication interventions in reducing the 
belief in misinformation about typhoid in Freetown 
 
 


































5 METHODS AND MATERIALS 
Studies I and II were quantitative studies based on nationwide household KAP surveys, 
carried out during the Ebola outbreak in Sierra Leone. Study III was a qualitative study, based 
on semi-structured interviews with Sierra Leonean journalists who reported during the Ebola 
outbreak. Lastly, Study IV was a randomized controlled trial. The overall methods of the four 
studies are summarized in table 1. 
Table 1. Methods of the four studies 
Study Population Timeline Design and sampling 
Outcome 
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5.1 STUDY SETTING 
All studies took place in Sierra Leone, one of the countries with the lowest gross national 
incomes per capita in the world.191 When the Ebola outbreak started in 2014, the country was 
on the road of recovery after a devastating civil war ravaged the nation between 1991 and 
2002.192 Around 70,000 people died during the war and 2.6 million people were displaced – 
accounting for more than half of the population of 4.3 million Sierra Leoneans at that 
time.193,194 During the war, life expectancy decreased from 42 years in 1990 to 34 years in 
2000.194 Since then, it has increased steadily and was around 54 years in 2018.195 At the end 
 
 33 
of the civil war, the total fertility rate was 6 and has since then dropped relatively quickly to 
4.2 in 2018.196 At the same time, child mortality decreased considerably, from around 260 to 
110 per 1000 live births between 1990 and 2019.197 As a result, the population of Sierra 
Leone still grows rather quickly – and currently stands at almost 8 million people.193 It is 
estimated that more than half of the population (55%) does not have enough money to buy 
sufficient amounts of food.198  
Sierra Leone is divided into four regions (West, North, East and South), which are further 
divided into 14 districts, see figure 4. The capital, Freetown, home to around 1 million 
people, is situated in the coastal Western Area. English is the official language of Sierra 
Leone, but the most widely spoken language is Krio – one of the 23 languages in the 
country.199 More than three quarters of Sierra Leoneans (78%) is Muslim, 21% is Christian.80 
 
Figure 4. Map of Sierra Leone Regions and Districts200 
Currently an estimated 43% of the adult population in Sierra Leone can read and write, but 
there is a large gender divide: 35% women are literate, compared to 52% of men.201 The low 
levels of literacy play a role in how Sierra Leoneans use media: radio is the most used 
medium, accessed by 81% of the population.202 There are many local and regional radio 
stations, but none of them have a nationwide reach. During the Ebola outbreak, the 
Independent Radio Network activated the network of radio stations they had set up to cover 
the 2007 elections. Using this network, the entire country could be reached.203 Internet access 
through computers or smartphones is still relatively low, but is rapidly increasing - 38% had 
access to internet in 2017. Large differences between rural and urban areas in terms of 
connectivity exist; around 65% of the urban population is estimated to have internet access, 
compared to less than 20% in rural areas.204 Only 13% of Sierra Leoneans had access to 
newspapers in 2015, and 45% could access TV.202 
1: Western Area Urban
2: Western Area Rural
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Sierra Leone used to be a media pioneer in West Africa, being the first country in the region 
to broadcast via radio and to publish newspapers.205 Unfortunately, the criminal libel law that 
was introduced in 1965 by the GoSL, was widely used to silence journalists.205 During the 
civil war, an estimated 70% of the media workforce fled the country.205 Even with the libel 
law still in place, the end of the civil war marked a comeback of many journalists and an 
expanding media landscape in the country. The law was finally repealed in July 2020.206 
Reporters without Borders classified press freedom as ‘problematic’ in Sierra Leone in 2020 
– it should be noted that this classification was made before the repeal of the libel law.207 
The data underlying Studies I and II were collected at four times points of the Ebola 
outbreak: in August 2014, October 2014, December 2014 and July 2015.  
The interviews for Study III were conducted in February and March 2016, a month after the 
last Ebola case was confirmed in the country. This qualitative study with Sierra Leonean 
journalists who reported during the Ebola outbreak was set in the Western Area - in urban 
Freetown and in Waterloo, a town about an hour drive from the capital.  
The randomized controlled trial for Study IV was carried out in the fall of 2019 and took 
place in Freetown, among adults who had a smartphone with WhatsApp.  
5.2 DESIGN AND DATA COLLECTION  
5.2.1 Study I and II: The KAP surveys 
Four nationwide, cross-sectional KAP surveys were conducted during the Ebola outbreak in 
Sierra Leone, in August 2014, October 2014, December 2014 and July 2015, see figure 5. 
The first survey took place during the exponential phase of the outbreak, and covered 9 out of 
the 14 districts in Sierra Leone - representing the districts with the highest Ebola 
transmission. Surveys two and three were administered one month before and after the 
national peak of the outbreak, respectively. The fourth survey took place during the long end 
tail of the outbreak, with relatively few cases nationwide. Surveys two to four covered all 14 
districts of Sierra Leone. For all surveys, multistage cluster sampling was used, whereby the 
2004 Sierra Leone Population and Housing Census List of Enumeration Areas208 was used as 
the sampling frame for the random selection of enumeration areas in the districts. Within the 
selected enumeration areas, households were selected through the random walk method - a 
form of systematic random sampling. In the selected households two interviews were carried 
out: one with the head of the household (usually a man) and the second with either a young 
person (aged 15-24 years) or a woman. The surveys comprised questions on knowledge (both 
correct knowledge and misconceptions around Ebola), attitudes (e.g. stigmatizing attitudes 
towards Ebola survivors) and behaviors (e.g. self-reported behaviors around Ebola 
prevention). The Sierra Leonean NGO FOCUS1000 was in charge of the data collection and 
training of the enumerators and received technical support from the CDC and UNICEF. The 
initial questionnaire was in English, which was translated during the training to local 
languages. The first survey was done on paper, but the subsequent surveys were carried out 
on tablets using Open Data Kit (ODK) software. The average response rate of the four 
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surveys was 98%. For Study I, data from all four surveys were pooled and analyzed. For 
Study II only surveys one to three were included, as the fourth survey did not include 
questions on risk perception – the main outcome of Study II. Study I and II were reported 
according to the guidelines for Strengthening the Reporting of Observational Studies.209 
 
Figure 5. Timeline of the KAP surveys during the Ebola outbreak in Sierra Leone 
 
5.2.2 Study III: The qualitative study 
For this qualitative study, journalists were interviewed who reported during the Ebola 
outbreak in Sierra Leone. The previously mentioned NGO FOCUS1000 in Freetown assisted 
in the purposive sampling of the interview candidates, using their wide network of media 
professionals in the country. Journalists were eligible when they were currently working for a 
news outlet and had experience reporting during the Ebola outbreak. A total of 13 journalists 
were interviewed in 12 interviews. The majority of the participants was male and worked for 
radio, which reflected the media landscape of Sierra Leone, see table 2. 10 of the 
interviewees were based in Freetown, the other three were based in Waterloo. Three 
journalists (all in Freetown) were involved in the organization of training sessions around 
Ebola for journalists and in message creation during the outbreak. The other 10 journalists 
were recipients of the training and disseminated the messages further. All semi-structured 
interviews were conducted in English and were held in the journalists’ radio studios or 
newsrooms. The interview guide was informed by the results from Study I, showing that 
exposure to various information sources, such as radio, was associated with knowledge, 
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during the outbreak, the information sources they accessed, as well as questions on 
knowledge and behaviors around Ebola.  
Four extra interviews were held with other Ebola stakeholders to contextualize the interviews 
with the journalists. Stakeholders included a representative from the Ministry of Health and 
Sanitation in Sierra Leone, a Sierra Leonean media expert, a representative from an 
international NGO and an international health expert deployed to the Ministry of Health in 
Liberia. The study was reported following the guidelines from the Consolidated Criteria for 
Reporting Qualitative Research.210 
Table 2. Demographics of the journalists 
Demographic Sample 
 
Location 10 in Freetown  
3 in Waterloo 
Age in years (mean, range) 37 (29-49) 
Sex 10 men 
3 women 
Education 4 high school 
9 university 
Medium 11 radio 
1 newspaper 
1 online news site 
Ebola training access 3 direct access to training and 
trainers themselves 
10 receiving training 
 
5.2.3 Study IV: The randomized controlled trial 
The Contagious Misinformation Trial was designed as a prospective, three-arm randomized 
controlled trial that took place in Freetown in 2019, aiming to counter prevalent 
misinformation about typhoid. In Sierra Leone, typhoid is commonly referred to as ‘typhoid-
malaria’ – whereby many people think typhoid is caused by mosquitoes and that typhoid and 
malaria always co-occur.211 During pilot studies in Freetown, people explained ‘typhoid-
malaria’ in different ways. For instance, that a malaria infection weakens the immune system, 
after which a typhoid infection would occur. Or people would say ‘typhoid and malaria walk 
on the same road’ and ‘typhoid and malaria are friends’. Like malaria, typhoid is 
characterized by fever. Unlike malaria, typhoid is caused by a bacterial infection, which is 
commonly transmitted through the fecal-oral route, often via contaminated water and food. 
Malaria, caused by parasite-infected mosquitoes, is much more common in Sierra Leone than 
typhoid. Incidence studies of malaria and typhoid from Sierra Leone are lacking, but 
modelled estimates suggest that there were an estimated 3 million malaria cases and around 
13,000 typhoid cases in 2017.212 Even though these numbers are modelled, it demonstrates 
the magnitude of the difference between malaria and typhoid incidence in Sierra Leone.  
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The gold standard to diagnose typhoid is through blood culture. In Sierra Leone however, 
there is currently only one hospital that has the facilities to do this, but limited resources 
constrain the actual use of it.213 Typhoid diagnoses are therefore commonly made using the 
Widal test – a test with low sensitivity, specificity and positive predictive value.214 
Furthermore, the test reportedly cross-reacts with malaria antigens, increasing the likelihood 
of false positive results in malaria endemic areas.215 Studies that compare typhoid and malaria 
diagnoses through different tests, show that the Widal test consistently overestimates the 
number of typhoid and malaria co-infections.216–218 For instance, a study in Northern India 
found that 8.5% of the 800 febrile patients tested positive for both malaria and typhoid when 
typhoid was diagnosed with the Widal test. When typhoid was diagnosed through culture, 
malaria and typhoid co-infection was found to be as low as 1.6%.216 A study in Cameroon 
found that of 200 patients with fever, 17% had concurrent malaria and typhoid when 
diagnosed through blood culture. However, when using the Widal test, as many as 48% of 
these patients were shown to have both typhoid and malaria.217 Another study in Nigeria 
found that out of 33 confirmed malaria patients, 42% also had typhoid according to the Widal 
test, compared to 6% when diagnosed through blood culture.218 It can be deduced that in 
Sierra Leone, with its reliance on the Widal test, typhoid is overdiagnosed. Patients also 
frequently hear in health centers that they have ‘typhoid-malaria’, likely often without 
diagnostic tests.219 This diagnosis also implies that antibiotics are commonly prescribed, in 
addition to antimalarials.220 The unnecessary usage of antibiotics likely contributes to 
antibiotic resistance and treatment failures.221 While data for Sierra Leone is lacking, studies 
in other West African countries show that multi-drug resistant typhoid is on the rise.222  
The Contagious Misinformation Trial aimed to counter the belief in typhoid-related 
misinformation, using audio dramas. Participants were randomized into three groups: two 
intervention groups or the control group. The two intervention groups received audio dramas 
of four episodes on WhatsApp about typhoid – every week on Mondays the next episode was 
sent. The interventions differed in that Intervention Group A received dramas that explicitly 
discussed the misinformation (Group A was called ‘Plausible Alternative’) (see figure 6), 
while Intervention Group B received audio dramas that only discussed the correct 
information about typhoid (the ‘Avoiding Misinformation’ group). Every episode had one 
core message, see table 3. The audio dramas were co-created with the Sierra Leonean well-
known actor’s group the Freetong Players and FOCUS1000, both trusted organizations that 
are grounded in the communities. All dramas were 
recorded in Krio and produced to incorporate the Sierra 
Leonean understanding and culture around typhoid and 
malaria. The correct(ive) information about typhoid was 
given by actors playing nurses and physicians in the 
dramas. The QR code gives access to the audio dramas, 
as well as their English transcripts. At the start of each 
episode, the Freetong Players identified themselves, 
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together with FOCUS1000 and Karolinska Institutet. The control group received two audio 
messages about breast feeding. 
Table 3. Core message per episode for the two intervention groups 
Episode Group A: Plausible Alternative 
 
Group B: Avoiding Misinformation 
1: Disease People think there is a disease called 
‘typhoid-malaria’, but these are actually 
two different diseases 
 
You can get typhoid by itself, without 
having other diseases 
2: Cause Typhoid is not caused by mosquitoes, but 
by contaminated water and food 
 
Typhoid is caused by contaminated water 
and food 
3: Prevention People think that sleeping under a bed net 
helps to prevent typhoid, but actually 
drinking treated water and cooking food 
properly are the best ways to avoid getting 
typhoid 
 
Prevent yourself from getting typhoid by 
cooking your food properly and drinking 
treated water only 
4: Repetition Repetition of core messages of episodes 
1-3 
Repetition of core messages of episodes  
1-3 
 
The study was powered to be able to detect a 15% reduction in the belief in typhoid-
misinformation. Based on pilot studies in Freetown, it was estimated that around 50% of the 
population believed in misinformation about typhoid. This led to an estimated sample size of 
around 250 participants in each study arm, taking into account attrition and intra-cluster 
correlation.223 A three-day training for 12 enumerators and three supervisors was conducted 
twice – one time before the recruitment and baseline survey and the second time before the 
follow-up survey. During the training, the recruitment and survey questions were practiced. 
The survey was in English and translated by a certified translator to Krio. 
Freetown comprises 64 administrative sections, 21 of which were selected using weighted 
random sampling, with weights proportionate to the population of the section. The three 
teams of four enumerators and one supervisor visited one section per day and administered 
the survey using ODK on tablets. In each section, an enumerator would recruit nine new 
participants who fit the inclusion criteria: 
• Living in Freetown 
• Aged 18 years or older 
• Fluent in Krio 
• In possession of a phone with WhatsApp 
• No hearing impairment 
The data collection team started in the approximate middle of the section and used the 
random walk method, with a skip interval of 15 households. The supervisors of the data 
collection teams were asked to, apart from supervising, recruit participants who did not have 
WhatsApp. Because smartphone users in Freetown might be wealthier and more highly 
educated than the general adult population of the city, we also recruited an additional 60 
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participants who did not have WhatsApp, but were in possession of a phone. These 
participants were called every week to listen to the audio dramas over the phone. This also 
allowed testing whether the interventions worked with a different mode of administration. 
Participants with WhatsApp were randomized 1:1:1 to one of the intervention groups or 
control group, see figure 6. Participants without WhatsApp were randomized 1:1 to one of the 
intervention groups.  
The enumerators were not supposed to say anything about misinformation when recruiting 
the participants, instead they called the study ‘Info Na Pawa’ (‘Information Is Power’ in Krio) 
and said the study aimed to understand people’s knowledge about diseases. Along with each 
new episode, participants received 10,000 Leones (around 1 USD) data credit to ensure they 
could download the episode. Study IV was reported in accordance with the Consolidated 
Standards for Reporting Trials224 and was pre-registered on ClinicalTrials.gov 
(NCT04112680).  
 
Figure 6. Overview of the Contagious Misinformation Trial 
 
5.3 DATA ANALYSIS 
5.3.1 Study I: Risk communication 
For Study I, the data from all four KAP surveys were pooled and composite variables were 
created for exposure to information sources, knowledge and practices. For exposure to 
information sources, the question ‘Through what means/ways did you learn about Ebola?’ 
was used. This was an open question in the survey; the enumerator ticked the boxes that 
corresponded to the answers of the respondents – more than one alternative could be ticked. 
Five categories were created, reflecting the media landscape in Sierra Leone:202 
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• Electronic media (radio and TV) 
• Print media (newspapers, brochures, other print material) 
• New media (mobile phones, text messages, internet) 
• Government (house visits by health workers, Ministry of Health and Sanitation) 
• Community (religious leaders, traditional leaders, megaphone public 
announcements, community meetings, friends and family)  
To make these categories mutually exclusive, those exposed to a source were compared to 
those who were not exposed to that source. To measure dose-response associations, a variable 
was created counting how many sources a respondent was exposed to, ranging between 0 and 
5. Composite variable for knowledge and misconceptions were created based on two open-
ended and five close-ended questions, see table 4. 
 
Table 4. Overview of knowledge questions in the KAP surveys 
Knowledge Questions Correct answers Incorrect answers 
What causes Ebola? Virus 
Bats/monkeys/chimpanzees 





What happens if someone suspected of Ebola 
goes to the hospital? 
They will take care of 
him/her (rehydrate, give 
medicine, monitor status) 
They won’t be able to do 
anything 
They will definitely cure Ebola 
They will find a way to kill the 
patient 
Extra in surveys 2-4: 
They will be turned away 
Can I prevent myself from getting Ebola by 
avoiding funeral/burial rituals that require 




If a person has Ebola, does he/she have a 
higher chance of survival if he/she goes 
immediately to a health facility? 
Yes No 
 
If a person with Ebola goes immediately to a 
health facility, will he/she reduce the chance 




Do you believe that traditional healers can 
treat Ebola successfully?  
No Yes 
 
Do you believe that spiritual healers can treat 
Ebola successfully? 
No Yes 
Maximum score Survey 1-4: 8 Survey 1:    12  Survey 2-4: 13 




Because from the second survey an extra answering alternative was added to reflect the on-
the-ground situation, the maximum number of correct or incorrect answers differed for the 
misconceptions score: in survey one a respondent could score a maximum of 12 wrong 
answers, and in survey two to four a maximum of 13. A similar approach was taken for risk 
and protective behavior, where two open-ended questions were used, see table 5. All scores 
were dichotomized based on the mean.  
Table 5. Overview of behavior questions in the KAP surveys 
Behavior questions Correct answers Incorrect answers 
In what ways have you changed your 
behavior or took actions to avoid being 
infected with Ebola? 
I wash my hands with soap 
and water 
I clean my hands with other 
disinfectants 
I try to avoid crowded places 
I wear gloves 
I try to avoid physical 
contact with people I suspect 
may have Ebola 
Extra in survey 2-4: 
I do not participate in burials 
that involve handling the 
dead body 
I use a condom when having 
sex with an Ebola survivor 
I wash my hands with just water 
I drink Bittercola 
I drink a lot of water/juices 
I drink traditional herbs 
I take antibiotics 
Extra in survey 2-4: 
I wash myself with salt and hot 
water 
 
What would you do if you suspect 
someone in your family has Ebola? 
 
Avoid all physical contact 
and bodily fluids of that 
person 




Help care for them at home 
Check temperature by touching 
the body 
Take to the hospital 
Extra in survey 2-4: 
Hide them 
Maximum score Survey 1:     7  Survey 2-4: 9 
Survey 1:     9  
Survey 2-4: 11 
Cut-off for dichotomization Survey 1:    0-2/3-7 Survey 2-4: 0-3/4-9 Survey 1-4: 0/≥1 
 
The associations between the various information sources and knowledge, misconceptions, 
protective behavior and risk behavior were analyzed using multilevel modeling, see figure 7. 
In an infectious disease outbreak, there is an inherent high correlation between cases over 
time and place. Multilevel modeling provides a way to account for this.225 To do so, clusters 
were created based on survey (i.e. time) and district, with a total of 51 clusters. Within the 
multilevel models, associations were estimated with crude and adjusted odds ratios (AORs) 
and their 95% confidence intervals (CI). The models were adjusted for age (15-20, 21-35, 36-
49, 50+ years), gender (male/female), education (no education, primary education, secondary 




Figure 7. Analysis plan of Study I 
Various studies have found that increased knowledge does not necessarily translate into the 
desired behaviors, also known as the ‘knowledge-behavior gap’.62–65 To test whether 
knowledge played a mediating role on the associations between exposure to information 
sources and protective behavior, mediation analyses were conducted using the mediated 
effect model.226 The same approach was used to test the mediating role of misconceptions on 
risk behavior. The ß coefficients for A and B (see figure 8) were obtained from the adjusted 
multilevel models. They were subsequently multiplied and Standard Errors (SEs) were 
calculated. The Chi2 distribution with 1 degree of freedom was used to determine the 
statistical significance of the mediated effects. For all analyses, alpha was set to 0.05 for 
statistical significance and SPSS 22 (Armonk, NY, USA) was used for the analysis. 
 
Figure 8. Mediation analysis Study I 
 
5.3.2 Study II: Risk perception 
To understand the role of risk perception and its associations with information sources, 
knowledge and practices, the first three KAP surveys were pooled for Study II. Risk 
perception was captured in the surveys with the questions: ‘What level of risk do you think 
you have in getting Ebola in the next 6 months?’ with the answering alternatives: ‘no risk, 
























perception’ and ‘some level of risk perception’. The composite variables for exposure to 
information sources, knowledge and misconceptions were created as explained under Study I. 
Furthermore, three specific protective behaviors were analyzed that played a role in the 
transmission of Ebola:  
• Washing hands with soap and water 
• Avoiding phyisical contact with people suspected to have Ebola 
• Avoiding burials/funerals that involve contact with the corpse 
For the same reasons as explained under Study I, multilevel modelling was used to analyze 
the data, adjusting for gender (male/female), age (15-20, 21-35, 36-49, 50+ years), education 
(no education, primary education, secondary and above), religion (Islam/Christianity) and 
region (North, East, South, West). Multilevel models were estimated based on 167 sampling 
clusters. Associations between information sources, knowledge, misconceptions, behavior 
and risk perception were tested, see figure 9.  
 
Figure 9. Analysis plan of Study II 
Furthermore, mediation analyses were carried out to test whether knowledge, misconceptions 
and the three behaviors had a mediating effect on the associations between exposure to 
information sources and risk perception. Similar to Study I, the mediated effect model was 
used, whereby the ß coefficients for A and B (see figure 10) were obtained from the fully 
adjusted models and multiplied.226 The statistical significance of the mediated effect was 
determined through the Chi2 distribution with 1 degree of freedom. StataMP 15 was used for 










Figure 10. Mediation analysis Study II  
 
5.3.3 Study III: Journalist roles 
All interviews were transcribed verbatim. The analysis (carried out in NVivo) was an 
iterative process; going back to the literature for deeper understanding of emerging topics and 
using the newly acquired knowledge for further interpretation of the data. Comparing and 
contrasting between journalists (for instance between rural and urban journalists, or between 
journalists with various levels of access to Ebola training) helped to make the analysis more 
latent. Peer examinations227 were carried out with a Sierra Leonean peer with an academic 
public health background, who worked and lived through the Ebola outbreak in Sierra Leone. 
Using his experiences, he provided feedback on the emerging themes.  
The analysis phase was inspired by, but not limited to, agenda-setting theory as described by 
McCombs 72,73,228 and journalists roles as described in other emergency settings.229–232 In the 
agenda-setting theory it is proposed that mass media often sets the agenda, determining what 
people get to see and hear. The theory also describes four behaviors journalists commonly 
adopt, which should be regarded as a continuum: professional detachment, targeted 
involvement, boosterism and proactive agenda-setting.228 For the first three behaviors, 
agenda-setting is regarded to be a passive by-product of reporting. In the last behavior 
(proactive agenda-setting), the journalist actively seeks to set the public’s agenda.228 
Previously described journalist roles include the various roles German journalists took on 
during E. coli outbreak in the country in 2011. Among others, journalists were public 
advocates, catalysts and public safety officials (informing people about the public health risks 
for instance).229 The earthquake in Japan in 2011 similarly showed that journalists who 
normally considered themselves to be watchdogs temporarily turned into public 
mobilizers.230,231 Journalists who experienced Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines in 2013 













5.3.4 Study IV: Contagious Misinformation Trial 
The Contagious Misinformation Trial had two primary outcomes: 
To reduce the belief that: 
1. Typhoid is caused by mosquitoes 
2. Typhoid co-occurs with malaria 
These outcomes were measured in the baseline and in the follow-up survey with the 
following questions: ‘Can a person get typhoid from mosquitoes?’ and ‘Can you get typhoid 
without getting malaria?’. The primary outcomes were analyzed with an intention-to-treat 
analysis, which excluded the participants who were lost to follow-up. Logistic regression 
models, both crude and adjusted, were controlled for the baseline value. The adjusted models 
included sociodemographic covariates: age (18-30, 31-49, 50+ years), gender (male/female), 
education (no formal, primary, secondary, post-secondary), religion (Islam/Christianity), and 
monthly income in Leones (0-300.000, 300.000-1.00.000, >1.000.000). Both intervention 
groups were compared to the control group as well as to each other.  
The two intervention groups with participants who did not have WhatsApp were similarly 
analyzed using an intention-to-treat analysis, comparing the intervention groups to the control 
group of the WhatsApp participants and to each other.  
To test whether the interventions unintentionally made people who held the correct belief at 
baseline believe the misinformation (i.e. whether the interventions seeded misinformation), 
logistic regression models were limited to people who held the correct beliefs at baseline. 
Similar to the intention-to-treat analysis, the intervention groups were compared to the 
control group and directly compared to each other. An exploratory analysis was conducted of 
two self-reported behaviors around typhoid prevention: an incorrect one (sleeping under a 
bed net) and a correct one (drinking treated water). This was based on the question whether 
participants were currently taking action to avoid typhoid infection in both the baseline and 
the follow-up survey. Those answering ‘yes’ to that question, received an open-ended 
question, asking them to list their actions. Enumerators would tick the corresponding answers 
on the tablet. Both behavioral outcomes were analyzed with logistic regression models, 
comparing the intervention groups to the control group and to each other. StataMP 15 was 
used for the analysis. To account for multiple hypothesis testing, a Bonferroni adjustment was 
applied, with an alpha set to 0.025 for statistical significance. 
5.4 REFLECTIONS ON MY ROLE 
I had different roles in the four studies. The data that was needed for Study I and II was 
collected while I was studying to get a Master’s degree in Public Health Epidemiology at KI. 
The team at FOCUS1000 conceptualized and carried out the data collection for the surveys. I 
was very lucky that they agreed to share some of the data with me and my supervisors to be 
analyzed for my Master’s thesis in the beginning of 2016.  
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I was also very lucky that the late professor Hans Rosling paid for my trip to visit 
FOCUS1000 in Freetown in 2016, so that I had a chance to understand the context of the data 
instead of analyzing the data from a distant laptop in the darkness of Sweden. Plus, I could do 
the data collection for a qualitative study around Sierra Leonean journalists (Study III). 
Staying in Freetown and working at the FOCUS1000 office was an eye-opener. As a Sierra 
Leonean organization, FOCUS1000 had a wide network in the entire country and enjoyed the 
trust of many ordinary Sierra Leoneans. I learned a lot about the difficulties of collecting data 
during an active outbreak; the logistics, the ethics, the speed at which it needed to happen and 
the trade-offs that needed to be made. Doing the interviews with the journalists provided 
input not only for Study III, but also gave a qualitative perspective on the results that emerged 
from Study I. Study III was a great learning experience in setting up a qualitative study, from 
conceptualizing and conducting qualitative interviews to the analysis and manuscript writing. 
Developing a study design is one thing, implementing and carrying out the study is 
something else. The process from rough ideas on paper to the actual interviews and data 
analysis gave me valuable insights into how many decisions you need to make along the way. 
Getting to know my colleagues at FOCUS1000 meant days filled with laughter and 
(sometimes awkward) cultural differences. I think to them I was a sweaty, hot-headed 
stranger who gave them lots to laugh at – from incidents involving yelling about corrupted 
visa fees at someone who turned out to be the head of immigration, to getting laughed at for 
being afraid of a rat running around the office. Together with my favorite FOCUS1000 driver 
and friend Sam, I spent hours driving (and getting stuck in traffic) to the interviews for Study 
III. Listening to Sam’s stories about the Ebola outbreak, but also his memories of the civil 
war gave me a much deeper understanding of Sierra Leonean culture. And he was almost like 
a therapist when the lack of electricity and the increasing temperatures started boiling my 
blood again - rationalizing and explaining why things were the way they were.  
That first trip to Freetown created a bond between FOCUS1000 and KI that deepened as my 
PhD progressed and culminated in Study IV – when I could experience quantitative data 
collection first hand, working closely together with FOCUS1000. The entire year of 2019 
revolved around the Contagious Misinformation Trial; early trips that year to Freetown 
involved lots of discussions about what kind of misinformation was prevalent in Sierra 
Leone. Together with Sam, I spent hours on markets talking to people about their beliefs 
around various diseases. FOCUS1000 called in the heads of their network of religious 
leaders, who gave their perspectives on which diseases people likely had misinformed ideas. 
It was not until I had heard people mention ‘typhoid-malaria’ a few times that I realized that 
this was something strange. Digging deeper, there turned about to be many narratives around 
‘typhoid-malaria’, and almost everybody we spoke to had heard about it. I thoroughly 
enjoyed doing this detective work, talking to so many people from all walks of life in Sierra 
Leone; from religious leaders, to medical doctors, to market women, to traditional healers 
(who kept referring to me as ‘Madam White Lady’ and offered to bathe me in protective 
blood). FOCUS1000 played an instrumental gatekeeping role in all of this, guiding me and 
bringing me in touch with people. Without mentioning FOCUS1000 when I introduced 
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myself, I would never have been able to get access to so many people. This became 
abundantly clear when I was with Sam in the slum area of Kroo Bay one day, to do further 
pilot testing. You can’t simply stroll around markets and ask people questions, or wander 
around slums and talk to people. Protocol demands that you first talk to the head of the 
market/slum to get their permission. When Sam and I located the head of Kroo Bay, I tried 
introducing myself, but he immediately started yelling at me. ‘You white people come here, 
want to do your so-called ‘research’, you make promises to us that things will change. But 
they never do! And you white people just leave!’ I was a bit taken aback by his tone and his 
aggression, but could only admit that he was quite right. Too often researchers and NGOs 
collect data to never be seen again. While I was stuttering a half-baked apology, Sam 
intervened. ‘Sir, this lady is with us, FOCUS1000.’ He showed the head of Kroo Bay his ID 
badge. In less than a second the face and posture of the man changed completely. ‘Ah you are 
with FOCUS1000? Why didn’t you say so? Of course you are welcome here! You can do the 
first interview with me!’ His anger had completely disappeared. He joined us for the next 
three hours while we walked around Kroo Bay and talked to its residents. FOCUS1000 also 
put me in touch with the Freetong Players, the actor’s group with whom we co-created the 
audio dramas for the intervention. Workshops with 12 outgoing actors, staff of FOCUS1000 
and a bewildered Helena (my main supervisor) and me led to many lively discussions 
(putting it mildly) and ended in long photo sessions with everybody involved. Together with 
the Head of Research of FOCUS1000, mister Paul Sengeh, we developed a sampling and 
data collection plan. Planning every detail of the recruitment and data collection was an 
enormous challenge, but gave me invaluable experience – and a whole new appreciation for 
data. Helena and I made a list of everything that could go wrong, and plans for how to 
mitigate these problems.  
Of course, when the data collection actually started, almost none of the things we listed went 
wrong. Instead a whole range of other problems popped up. Data collection tablets that were 
not charged on the morning they should have gone out. Enumerators who took a creative turn 
in the recruitment of participants. The sheer reality of recruitment and data collection in a 
slum, or in the hills of Freetown. Dirty rivers and fences had to be crossed sometimes to be 
able to find the next suitable household, all the while keeping an eye on a map to ensure you 
were still in the designated section. As part of quality assurance measures, I drove around 
with Sam to bring surprise visits to the enumerators, checking whether they gave the correct 
information to participants and asked the questions according to how we practiced them. 
When the interventions started, we had problems with sending the data credit incentives. The 
company that was supposed to do it conveniently ‘forgot’ to send credit to many participants, 
and could never work in a transparent way. This left us in the dark about who had received 
credit and who was right to complain to never have received anything. From week 3, we took 
the control, demanded our prepaid credit back and hired three enumerators to manually, 
phone number by phone number, send the data credit to our 700+ participants. The follow-up 
survey posed a whole range of new logistical problems: instead of following a skip interval, 
we now had to find our participants back. This actually went better than expected – we 
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reached 91% of them. Attending some of the follow-up interviews was quite the experience: 
some people came fully prepared with all the documents we gave them during recruitment, 
telling stories that they had gathered community meetings to talk about typhoid-malaria 
(fantastic of course, despite us asking to not share any information until after the follow-up 
survey). Others complained that they never received the dramas or the credit, that their 
phones had broken, or that WhatsApp had expired. Planning and supervising data collection 
in a low-income setting was both the most stressful and the most enriching experience of my 
PhD journey.   
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6 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The KAP surveys that formed the basis of Studies I and II were administered during an active 
outbreak. The research team in Sierra Leone faced several ethical dilemmas while collecting 
the data. The results of the KAP surveys aimed to provide the response to the outbreak with 
an up-to-date nationwide overview of knowledge and behavior of the general public. This 
meant that it was vital to include people who were at that moment potentially at high risk of 
contracting Ebola; families of sick people for instance. It was decided that these people, 
despite the risk they may pose, should not be excluded from the data collection, so that true 
insights into the knowledge and behaviors of the public could be obtained.  
The results of the KAP surveys revealed that misconceptions and risky behaviors were not 
uncommon. Whereas in essence, it is not the job of a research team to educate their 
respondents on the rights and wrongs of different aspects of Ebola, it was decided to give all 
participants a brochure with information about Ebola after the interview. They were also 
given the chance to ask the enumerators questions about the virus. Enumerators were trained 
to answer these questions. In case they could not answer a question, they referred the 
participants to the Ebola hotline. In an outbreak setting, ethical implications should be extra 
carefully considered, so that data collection can be done in the best and most neutral way 
possible, while ensuring the principle of justice by including all eligible people – also those 
at-risk. Enumerators themselves could also have been considered to be at-risk during their 
work. They were extensively trained on all aspects of the virus and were instructed to not 
make bodily contacts, shake hands or enter the homes of participants.  
As I came into the project after the data collection of the KAP surveys had finished, I did not 
actively have to make the many inherently difficult decisions the research team in Sierra 
Leone was facing. In talks with FOCUS1000 employees in Freetown, I learned a lot about the 
ethical implications of research in an outbreak setting in a low-income country. For instance, 
methods such as verbal consent had to be employed so that people with low literacy could 
also be included in the study - adhering to the principle of justice. Trade-offs in the rigor of 
study designs and the need to ensure fair access to interventions and potentially life-saving 
information, meant that observational studies were preferred, despite the fact that 
experimental studies would provide more rigorous evidence. 
The data collection about the Ebola outbreak that I was involved in, was for Study III: the 
qualitative study with Sierra Leonean journalists. Ethical issues I had considered for that 
study were regarding the potential impact the interviews could have on journalists by 
bringing back painful memories of the outbreak. Furthermore, as Sierra Leone does not enjoy 
entire freedom of press in practice, I was careful to make sure that the transcripts of the 
interviews could not be traced back to individual journalists. From the start of the analysis, 
names and affiliations were removed.  
In Study IV, I organized and supervised the data collection for the Contagious 
Misinformation Trial in Freetown, together with FOCUS1000. An important ethical 
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consideration for the trial revolved around the topic of misinformation. As the trial aimed to 
counter misinformation, we wanted to start with misinformed beliefs that were prevalent 
among the general public in Sierra Leone. Because the first studies were about Ebola, a 
natural extension would be to continue with that topic – trying to counter misinformation 
about Ebola. However, as pilot studies in Freetown made clear, Ebola is still a very sensitive 
topic in Sierra Leone. Merely talking or asking people questions about it, might incite the 
belief that Ebola is back. Many Sierra Leoneans fear that the virus will present itself again 
sooner or later. Our collaborators at FOCUS1000 strongly advised against using Ebola as a 
topic for the trial. Instead, we found that there is a lot of misinformation about another 
infectious disease: typhoid. The risk of doing harm with this topic (e.g. in the form of inciting 
rumors) was deemed to be very low.  
The trial itself was not expected to pose harm to participants. It did not involve invasive 
procedures and people were only asked to listen to audio messages on WhatsApp. Every 
episode of the audio dramas contained correct information. All participants were extensively 
briefed on what it meant to participate in the trial and were not further enrolled before 
informed consent was obtained. Participants received contact information of the team 
members of the trial, as well as the phone number of the trial hotline, so that any concerns 
they had could be addressed. Participants were not told that the aim of the trial was to counter 
misinformation. Doing so could have potentially biased our results. Instead, the name of the 
trial in Krio was translated to ‘Info Na Pawa’ (meaning: Information is Power), highlighting 
that good information is important for people’s health. After completion of the follow-up 
survey, all participants received an information sheet, explaining in detail the actual aim of 
the study, and countering the misinformation around typhoid. This information was read out 
loud to illiterate participants. All participants were encouraged to ask any questions they had 
about typhoid; enumerators were trained to answer them. Naturally, all collected data was 
anonymized, kept safe on servers that were compliant with the EU’s General Data Protection 
Regulations and only made available to team members involved in the data analysis of the 
trial.  
Ethical permission was obtained for all studies, both in Sweden at the Swedish Ethical 
Review Authority in Stockholm and in Sierra Leone at the Sierra Leone Ethics and Scientific 





7.1 STUDY I: INFORMATION SOURCES, KNOWLEDGE AND BEHAVIORS 
Pooling the four KAP surveys resulted in a sample size of 10,604 respondents. Due to 
missing data, 95 respondents (0.9%) were excluded, bringing the sample size for the study to 
10,509. The sample had an even distribution between men (49%) and women (51%) and 67% 
of the sample was affiliated with Islam. Almost half (48%) of the respondents had attained 
secondary education or higher. Information about Ebola was most commonly received 
through electronic media (i.e. radio and TV) (94%) and community sources such as religious 
or traditional leaders (60%). A majority (73%) of the respondents had heard Ebola messages 
through at least 2 different information sources.  
7.1.1 Information sources, knowledge and protective behavior 
Being exposed to any kind of information source was significantly associated with increased 
Ebola-specific knowledge, see figure 11. The strongest association was found for electronic 
media (Adjusted Odds Ratio (AOR) 1.75, 95% Confidence Interval (CI) 1.46-2.09). There 
were similar associations between exposure to information sources and protective behavior, 
whereby new media showed the strongest association (AOR 2.15, 95% CI 1.87-2.48).  
 
Figure 11. Associations between exposure to information sources and knowledge, protective behavior 
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7.1.2 Information sources, misconceptions and risk behavior 
Unfortunately, there was another side of the coin: all information sources apart from print 
media were also associated with Ebola-specific misconceptions, but with lower point 
estimates, see figure 12. Being exposed to electronic and print media was not associated with 
risk behaviors around Ebola. New media, government and community sources however, did 
have a significant association with risk behavior.  
 
Figure 12. Associations between exposure to information sources and misconceptions, risk behavior 
 
7.1.3 Clear dose-response associations 
For all four outcomes (knowledge, misconceptions, protective and risk behavior), point 
estimates increased with exposure to more information sources, compared to being exposed 
to none or just one information source, see table 6. Protective behavior had the strongest 
dose-response association, whereby exposure to 4-5 sources resulted in an AOR of 6.77 (95% 
CI 5.53-8.28).  
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Table 6. Dose-response associations between information sources, knowledge, misconceptions, protective 
and risk behavior 
 Knowledge Protective 
behavior 





















   2 sources 1.37 (1.23-1.53)* 1.38 (1.23-1.54)* 1.07 (0.95-1.19) 1.18 (1.06-1.32)* 
   3 sources 2.09 (1.86-2.35)* 2.78 (2.46-3.14)* 1.67 (1.47-1.88)* 1.57 (1.40-1.77)* 
   4-5 sources 3.83 (3.17-4.61)* 6.77 (5.53-8.28)* 1.86 (1.56-2.22)* 1.87 (1.59-2.18)* 
 
*p-value <0.05 
†Adjusted for region, sex, age, religion, educational level, level of outbreak, all information sources  
‡Adjusted for all of the above, plus knowledge and misconceptions 
OR = Odds Ratio, CI = Confidence Interval 
 
 
7.1.4 Knowledge and misconceptions as mediators 
The mediation analyses showed that knowledge played a mediating role on the associations 
between exposure to all tested information sources and protective behavior, see table 7. A 
similar trend could be seen in the mediation analyses for misconceptions and risk behavior, 
whereby misconceptions played a mediating role on risk behavior for all information sources, 
apart from print media.  
Table 7. Mediation analyses between knowledge and protective behavior, misconceptions and risk 
behavior 
 Knowledge Misconceptions 
Information sources Beta AB (SE) Beta AB (SE) 
   Electronic media 0.369 (0.066)* 0.140 (0.040)* 
   Print media 0.256 (0.061)* -0.009 (0.034) 
   New media 0.226 (0.048)* 0.063 (0.028)* 
   Government 0.294 (0.038)* 0.091 (0.022)* 
   Community  0.242 (0.037)* 0.132 (0.025)* 
 
*p-value<0.05 based on Chi2 test with 1df 








7.2 STUDY II: RISK PERCEPTION AND RISK COMMUNICATION 
The three pooled KAP surveys (KAP 1-3, see figure 5) yielded a sample size of 7,039 
respondents. Demographic characteristics are in line with the four KAP surveys described in 
section 7.1. In the first KAP survey, 59% of respondents indicated that they perceived some 
level of risk of contracting Ebola in the next six months. This went down to 43% in both the 
second and third survey. Compared to survey one, this was a significant decrease (survey two 
AOR 0.40 95% CI 0.25-0.64, survey three AOR 0.37 95% CI 0.25-0.56).  
7.2.1 Risk perception and information sources 
From the five information sources tested, new media and community sources were 
significantly associated with increased risk perception (new media AOR 1.53 95% CI 1.21-
1.93; community AOR 1.28 95% CI 1.07-1.53), see figure 13. Print media had a borderline 
significant association with increased risk perception (AOR 1.24 95% CI 1.00-1.54).  
 
Figure 13. Associations between exposure to information sources and risk perception 
 
7.2.2 Risk perception, knowledge and behaviors 
Having appropriate Ebola-specific knowledge was significantly associated with increased 
risk perception (AOR 1.42 95% CI 1.15-1.75), see figure 14. Having misconceptions around 
Ebola however, was associated with decreased risk perception (AOR 0.67 95% CI 0.55-0.82). 
Regarding the specific Ebola behaviors, hand washing was associated with increased 
perception of risk (AOR 1.40 95% CI 1.13-1.74). Avoiding burials on the other hand, was 
associated with a decreased perception of risk (AOR 0.77 95% CI 0.62-0.96), while avoiding 
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Figure 14. Associations between knowledge, misconceptions, behaviors and risk perception 
 
7.2.3 Knowledge, misconceptions, behaviors as mediators  
Knowledge and misconceptions played a mediating role on the associations between 
exposure to all information sources (apart from electronic media) and risk perception, see 
table 8. While avoiding physical contact was not directly associated to risk perception, this 
behavior was a mediator for all information sources, apart from electronic media. Practicing 
frequent hand washing was a mediator only for government and community sources, 
avoiding unsafe burials for new media, government and community sources.  
Table 8. Mediation analyses between knowledge, misconceptions, behaviors and risk perception 






Beta AB (SE) Beta AB (SE) Beta AB (SE) Beta AB (SE) Beta AB (SE) 
   Electronic     
media 
0.230 (0.082) -0.033 (0.060) 0.121 (0.066) 0.041 (0.049) -0.144 (0.082) 
   Print media 0.076 (0.044)* -0.022 (0.051)* 0.082 (0.059) 0.032 (0.037)* -0.156 (0.076) 
   New media 0.120 (0.055)* -0.059 (0.050)* 0.106 (0.059) 0.036 (0.041)* -0.076 (0.042)* 
   Government 0.136 (0.053)* -0.087 (0.045)* 0.096 (0.047)* 0.029 (0.033)* -0.057 (0.037)* 
   Community 0.107 (0.045)* -0.069 (0.044)* 0.111 (0.045)* 0.020 (0.023)* -0.110 (0.054)* 
 
*p-value <0.05 based on Chi2 test with 1df 
SE = Standard Error 
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7.3 STUDY III: ROLES OF SIERRA LEONEAN JOURNALISTS 
Four main themes around journalist roles were identified in the data, which are summarized 
in figure 15. The themes have a chronological order, as this is how the journalists reflected on 
their experiences reporting during the Ebola outbreak in Sierra Leone. 
  
 
Figure 15. Themes and categories 
7.3.1 Skeptical monitors 
The journalists explained that during the first months of the Ebola outbreak, there was a lot of 
confusion about the existence of the outbreak, because the first cases were confined to the 
Eastern Province of the country – away from Freetown and an area where the (at that time) 
political opposition had a stronghold. Journalists did not take the outbreak seriously in the 
beginning:  
‘…A strange illness had arrived, it transferred to contacts and it is killing people fast. But 
then, we didn’t take it seriously. Because it was confined to a far part of the country. The 
attitude was ‘it’s not my business’, to some extent that was also the attitude of the 
government.’ (Journalist 6) 
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‘There was this perception among people that Ebola was a political tool, meant to wipe out 
the population of people where it all started.’ (Journalist 10) 
Journalists said that it was hard to get official information about the outbreak: 
‘Some of the major challenges we had here, was how to get to them [Ministry of Health and 
Sanitation]. Just to explain the Ebola thing. It took time. We had to go to other communities 
to interview health experts, asking them questions, asking to give information.’ (Journalist 3) 
7.3.2 Eyewitnesses and victims to educators and public mobilizers 
Apart from being reporters, the journalists in the study were also members of the public, 
citizens who experienced an outbreak up close. Most of the journalists lost friends or family 
members to Ebola. It terrified the journalists:  
‘Initially we were so scared, even of recording. We thought, what if the person was talking 
and the saliva just came on your hand?... How do we hold the microphone?’ (Journalist 4) 
The journalists still perceived a lack of official information about the outbreak, especially 
those working outside of Freetown. Some journalists in Freetown managed to get health 
experts to come explain the outbreak and the disease to their staff: 
‘At one point, the CDC organized a media orientation for journalists to educate us on what 
Ebola was all about. The signs and symptoms of Ebola, what you need to do, what are the 
best practices for us to stop transmission of the disease.’ (Journalist 12) 
Journalists said that the training reduced their fear and gave them practical tips on how to 
minimize their risks while reporting.  
‘Once we had that knowledge, we had the power to feel the fear, but to confront the enemy 
anyways.’ (Journalist 4) 
7.3.3 Conflicted mobilizers 
The journalists said that the information from the Ebola training made their reporting about 
the outbreak more in line with official sources. As the journalists in this study perceived 
themselves to be highly trusted by their communities, several of them felt that reporting in 
line with messages from the government made their audiences suspicious about their motives:  
‘Some people said, you guys are talking too much, that means that the government gives you 
a lot of money, that’s why you are talking.’ (Journalist 1) 
A further complication of their reporting was that some of their messages raised more 
questions than they could answer: 
‘We educated the people a lot, but the information that we passed at that time was not that 
enough. Sometimes it was contradictory. Because you tell people don’t come near the sick, 
but who is going to take care of the sick?’ (Journalist 1) 
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7.3.4 Collaborative instructors 
Journalists said that as the outbreak continued, they became partners of the response. They 
started sharing their stage with health experts, local leaders and other trusted voices in their 
communities.  
‘People [journalists] host swabbers [those who take samples from corpses to determine the 
cause of death], burial team members, doctors, nurses at ETUs, traditional healers and 
leaders. Healers talking to other healers and ask them to stop their practices for a while. 
Religious leaders asking people not to touch dead bodies until swabbers had come and 
confirmed it was negative. Through that medium, each category of people had been targeted.’ 
(Journalist 11) 
Journalists also reflected that the nature of their jobs changed during the outbreak; from 
independent reporters to collaborative instructors: 
‘Before Ebola, our editorial policy was just to give views and information. We don’t tell 
people what to do. We give our views and information and allow people to make their own 
decisions. When Ebola came, we realized it should be a different type of information 
dissemination. In fact, it was communication and not information. And by communication it 




7.4 STUDY IV: CONTAGIOUS MISINFORMATION TRIAL 
A total of 736 participants with WhatsApp were included at baseline and randomized to one 
of the three groups. With 68 participants lost to follow-up (see figure 16), the completion rate 
was 91%. At baseline, 94% of the participants had heard of the term ‘typhoid-malaria’. Belief 
in typhoid misinformation was prevalent at baseline, 51% of the participants believed that 
mosquitoes cause typhoid, and 59% believed that typhoid and malaria always co-occur. There 
was no significant difference between the randomized groups at baseline. Among the 60 
participants with no WhatsApp, 62% believed in the mosquito cause and 75% believed that 
typhoid and malaria co-occur.  
 
 
Figure 16. Flowchart of the Contagious Misinformation Trial 
 
7.4.1 Intention-to-treat analysis 
The intention-to-treat analysis of the WhatsApp participants showed that the belief in typhoid 
misinformation was reduced in both intervention groups compared to the control group, see 
table 9. Due to the Bonferroni adjustment, Group B was borderline significant on the 
mosquito-outcome (p-value: 0.029). A direct comparison between the two intervention 
groups showed that Group A (Plausible Alternative) had a greater reduction than Group B 
(Avoiding Misinformation) on both outcomes.  
7.4.2 No misinformation seeded 
The interventions did not unintentionally seed misinformation among the participants who 
held the correct beliefs at baseline (table 9). On both outcomes, participants in Group A were 
less likely to believe the misinformation at follow-up compared to the control (mosquito 
outcome AOR 0.25 95% CI 0.15-0.81, malaria outcome AOR 0.39 95% CI 0.18-0.82). There 
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Table 9. Results of intention-to-treat, seeding misinformation, behavioral and non-WhatsApp analyses  
 Adjusted* OR 
(95% CI) 







Typhoid comes  
from mosquitoes 
    
   Group A 0.29 (0.18-0.47) 0.000  0.46 (0.28-0.76) 0.002 
   Group B 0.61 (0.39-0.95) 0.029 Reference - 
   Control group Reference - - - 
Typhoid and  
malaria co-occur 
    
   Group A  0.29 (0.19-0.45) 0.000  0.51 (0.33-0.81) 0.004 
   Group B  0.55 (0.36-0.83) 0.004  Reference - 




Typhoid comes  
from mosquitoes 
    
   Group A 0.35 (0.15-0.81) 0.014 0.41 (0.16-1.05) 0.064 
   Group B 0.70 (0.33-1.51) 0.369 Reference - 
   Control group Reference - - - 
Typhoid and  
malaria co-occur 
    
   Group A 0.39 (0.18-0.82) 0.014 0.72 (0.33-1.58) 0.413 
   Group B 0.58 (0.29-1.16) 0.123 Reference - 




Sleeping under  
a bed net 
    
   Group A 0.43 (0.24-0.78) 0.005 0.66 (0.35-1.27) 0.213 
   Group B 0.64 (0.36-1.12) 0.118 Reference - 
   Control group Reference - - - 
Drinking treated  
water 
    
   Group A 2.78 (1.67-4.64) 0.000 1.57 (0.92-2.68) 0.100 
   Group B 1.77 (1.08-2.91) 0.023 Reference - 




Typhoid comes  
from mosquitoes 
    
   Group A 0.20 (0.07-0.52) 0.001 1.57 (0.33-7.36) 0.569 
   Group B 0.21 (0.07-0.64) 0.006 Reference - 
   Control group Reference - - - 
Typhoid and  
malaria co-occur 
    
   Group A 0.13 (0.05-0.35) 0.000 0.55 (0.10-2.90) 0.480 
   Group B 0.26 (0.10-0.70) 0.008  Reference - 
   Control group Reference - -  - 
 
*Adjusted for: sex, education, religion, income, age 
OR = Odds Ratio, CI = Confidence Interval   
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7.4.3 Typhoid behaviors  
Participants in Group A were less likely than the control group to report that they prevented 
typhoid infection by sleeping under a bed net (AOR 0.43 95% CI 0.24-0.78). There was no 
difference on this behavior between Group B and the control group. Participants in both 
intervention groups were significantly more likely to drink treated water to avoid typhoid 
infection (Group A AOR 2.78 95% CI 1.67-4.64, Group B AOR 1.77 95% CI 1.08-2.91). 
There was no difference between the two intervention groups on either of these outcomes.  
7.4.4 Participants without WhatsApp 
Among the participants who did not have WhatsApp, the belief in misinformation was 
reduced in both intervention groups compared to the control group (table 9), on both the 
belief that typhoid is caused by mosquitoes (Group A: AOR 0.20, 95% CI 0.07-052, Group 
B: AOR 0.21, 95% CI 0.07-0.64) and the belief typhoid and malaria co-occur (Group A: 
AOR 0.13, 95 % CI 0.05-0.35, Group B: AOR 0.26, 95% CI 0.10-0.70). There was no 















‘We need to learn from earlier mistakes. The denial syndrome 
was a big problem. We need to learn how to get politics out of 
Ebola, or similar national emergency responses. People need 
to understand that some problems affect us all, and are bigger 
than tribe or party.’ (p. 129 in 233)  
 
These words were spoken by Chief Kallon, from Kailahun, who helped bring Ebola 
to an end in his district (see text box in section 2.4). Replace ‘Ebola’ in this quote 
with ‘COVID-19’ and it perfectly reflects the first 10 months of the coronavirus 
pandemic. Many lessons were learned during the West African Ebola outbreak. It’s 












8.1 MAIN FINDINGS 
Results from the analyses of the four KAP surveys, carried out at four time points of the 
Ebola outbreak in Sierra Leone, showed that exposure to information sources was associated 
with increased Ebola-specific knowledge and protective behavior. At the same time, exposure 
to all information sources, apart from print and electronic media, was also associated with 
Ebola-specific misconceptions and risk behavior. There was a strong dose response 
association; the more information sources one was exposed to, the higher the odds to exhibit 
appropriate knowledge, protective behavior, misconceptions and risk behavior. Knowledge 
and misconceptions played a mediating role on the associations between exposure to 
information sources and protective and risk behavior. The pooled analyses of the first three 
KAP surveys showed that exposure to new media (i.e. mobile phones, internet) and 
community sources (i.e. religious/traditional leaders) was associated with increased risk 
perception. While having appropriate knowledge about Ebola was associated with increased 
risk perception, Ebola-specific misconceptions were associated with lower perceptions of 
risk. Specific behaviors around Ebola showed a mixed picture in terms of their association 
with risk perception – increased frequency of hand washing was associated with increased 
risk perception, but avoiding burials was linked to decreased risk perception. Knowledge, 
misconceptions and behaviors played a mediating role on the associations between most 
information sources and risk perception.  
Sierra Leonean journalists adopted various roles over the course of the Ebola outbreak. What 
started with skepticism about the existence of an outbreak in the beginning, changed into 
fears for the virus, which also impacted their work as journalists. Being educated about the 
virus empowered them and made them step away from their professional detachment as 
journalists to become instructors.  
Results from the Contagious Misinformation Trial showed that the belief in typhoid-related 
misinformation was significantly reduced in both intervention groups compared to the control 
group. Furthermore, explicitly mentioning the misinformation and then providing an 
alternative (i.e. Intervention Group A) reduced the belief in misinformation more than 
focusing on the correct information only (i.e. Intervention Group B).  
8.1.1 Information sources, knowledge and behaviors 
The findings from Study I might appear slightly counterintuitive in that exposure to 
information sources was associated to knowledge and protective behaviors as well as to 
misconceptions and risk behaviors. This can be partially explained by the contradicting 
messages that were sent during the Ebola outbreak.28 Moreover, various explanations and 
theories around Ebola can co-exist in communities. A cross-sectional survey carried out 
during the Ebola outbreak in Guinea, found that while 83% of the respondents indicated that 
a virus caused Ebola, 36% also believed that higher powers played a role in causing the 
outbreak.234 Exposure to electronic media (which was mostly radio), showed strong 
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associations with knowledge and protective behavior, but also with misconceptions. 
Communication through radio was not unidirectional during the outbreak; listeners were 
encouraged to call in with their questions and community leaders and experts were invited for 
interviews on radio. The strong associations could therefore be a result of various sources 
coming together in radio.  
8.1.2 Risk perception  
Results from Study II showed that only exposure to new media and community sources were 
associated with increased perception of Ebola risk. Compared to the other information 
sources in the study, these sources share the characteristic that they are more interactive; 
recipients of the information can express concerns and pose questions.45,235 Especially 
community leaders are commonly regarded as highly trusted sources of information.44  
While a heightened perception of risk is regarded to be a key determinant of behavior change 
by the WHO,53 the observed associations in Study II between risk perception and the various 
Ebola-specific behaviors do not seem to follow that logic. Previous studies have also reported 
ambiguous results when looking at risk perception and behavior change.236–238 An 
explanation for this might lie in the nature of the data: cross-sectional surveys might not show 
an accurate picture of the interplay between risk perception and behavior. In the ‘risk 
reappraisal hypothesis’, Brewer et al. argue that time is an important and overlooked variable 
in risk perception and behavior change.239 People might adopt protective behaviors facing a 
certain risk and in turn feel less at risk, precisely because they have changed their behavior.239 
The negative association between avoiding traditional burials and risk perception could 
therefore be an indication that those who avoided burials felt at less risk for Ebola because 
they avoided these high risk events. Similarly, the finding that hand washing was associated 
with increased Ebola risk perception could come from people feeling at risk and therefore 
feeling more inclined to wash their hands. Temporal data is needed to further test the risk 
reappraisal hypothesis. While the KAP surveys were collected at different time points, they 
should still be regarded as cross-sectional data.  
8.1.3 Journalist roles 
As Sierra Leonean journalists experienced and reported on the Ebola outbreak in their 
country, their roles shifted. Interestingly, they side-stepped their professional detachment as 
journalists when they turned into instructors – something that has not been observed among 
journalists reporting in other disaster settings.229,230,240,241 While many factors can influence 
how journalists react in emergency situations,68,232,242–244 one of the reasons that Sierra 
Leonean journalists stepped away from their detachment might lie in the fact that they were 
also personally affected by the outbreak. Many of the study participants lost family members 
or friends to Ebola, and all of them saw the emergency play out in front of their eyes. This 
might have increased their perceived need to inform their fellow citizens about the dangers of 
Ebola. The lack of understanding about the disease in the first months of the outbreak had a 
 
 65 
paralyzing effect on the journalists. Acquiring knowledge through training was a turning 
point – it empowered them to carry out their jobs again.  
8.1.4 Contagious misinformation 
Results from the randomized controlled trial showed that both interventions significantly 
reduced the belief in typhoid-related misinformation, compared to the control group. 
Intervention Group A (Plausible Alternative) generally showed stronger reductions than 
Intervention Group B (Avoiding Misinformation). A similar trend could be seen in the 
analyses of the two self-reported behaviors (i.e. sleeping under a bed net and drinking treated 
water). It can be speculated that one of the reasons for this difference might lie in the 
dramatic elements of the audio dramas in Group A. Because these episodes explicitly 
mentioned the misinformation and then debunked them, there was more conflict and debate. 
This may have increased the ‘stickiness’ of the content.245 However, the misinformation itself 
also proved to be sticky: despite significant reductions in the belief in misinformation in the 
intervention groups, the belief was not completely eradicated in either group. This finding can 
likely be explained by the continued influence effect of misinformation, whereby despite 
credible corrections, there was (to some extent) a continued reliance on the 
misinformation.167,168,170 A recent meta-analysis of 32 studies found that the influence of 
previous misinformation never seems to be entirely eliminated.246 
An often-debated topic in debunking misinformation is the unintended backfire effect, 
whereby debunking efforts can enhance people’s believe in the misinformation.172 While this 
trial did not specifically study a backfire effect, results show that the interventions did not 
unintentionally seed misinformation among those who held the correct beliefs at baseline. 
The finding that the self-reported wrong behavior (i.e. sleeping under a bed net to avoid 
typhoid infection) was significantly reduced in Group A, but not in Group B, could be 
explained by the fact that this was explicitly mentioned in the audio dramas for Group A 
(while at the same time highlighting that sleeping under a bed net should be done to prevent 
malaria). As it was wrong information, there was no mentioning of bed nets in the dramas for 
Group B.  
WhatsApp has been utilized for health promotion in various settings, but this has so far been 
fairly limited in low- and middle-income countries.247–249 The Contagious Misinformation 
Trial showed that using WhatsApp to deliver debunking messages in a low-income setting is 
feasible, bearing in mind that the recipients of these messages might not be representative of 
the general population. Further studies should be carried out to determine the scalability of 
interventions using WhatsApp.  
8.2 THEORETICAL CONTEXT 
Various health communication and behavior change theories can help to contextualize and 
ground the findings of the four studies.250 Theories have inherent limitations in that they are 
highly simplified explanations of human behavior and generally assume that people are rather 
rational beings. Facing a deadly infectious disease outbreak understandably elicits strong 
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emotions, which likely influence rational thinking and acting. With that drawback in mind, 
some theories help to explain the findings of the four studies.   
8.2.1 Health Behavior Model 
The HBM focuses on the individual level of health beliefs and behaviors.250 It poses that the 
perceived susceptibility to a disease, the perceived severity of a disease, the perceived costs 
and benefits of taking action, cues to action and the perceived self-efficacy of the individual 
all influence people’s decisions to engage in certain health practices.66,250 The results from 
Study I show that exposure to information sources was associated with knowledge and 
misconceptions – likely influencing the perceived susceptibility to and severity of Ebola. 
Similarly, exposure to information sources likely influenced the self-reported protective and 
risk behaviors through the perceived cost and benefits of taking action. While the actual 
content of various risk communication messages was not analyzed, the available messaging 
guidelines show that messages generally included cues to action.77 All these factors may help 
to explain the public’s behaviors during the Ebola outbreak. 
The Sierra Leonean journalists interviewed for Study III shared their experiences on the 
individual level and on a community level. Their lived experiences on an individual level, 
being citizens and journalists during an unprecedented health emergency, likely influenced 
their views of the severity of Ebola and their own perceived susceptibility to getting infected, 
as well as the actions they did or did not take.  
The perceived susceptibility to and severity of Ebola is also closely linked to the concept of 
risk perception. Study II showed that having appropriate knowledge about Ebola was 
associated with increased risk perception, having misconceptions with decreased risk 
perception – well in line with the HBM. However, the mixed results regarding the protective 
behaviors, as well as the finding that only the more interactive information sources were 
associated with increased risk perception, indicate that the HBM might not be sufficient to 
contextualize the findings. A broader approach could give different insights. 
8.2.2 Social Cognitive Theory 
The Social Cognitive Theory (SCT) might help to explain some of the results further.250–252 
This theory takes a broader perspective, and poses that personal factors and characteristics, 
environmental factors and behavior all influence each other. Communication in general 
should be placed in this broader context, acknowledging that the interactions between 
individual, community and societal levels are complex and difficult to disentangle.252,253  
The mixed results in Study II around the Ebola-specific behaviors can be explained using 
SCT, as well as through the risk reappraisal theory, as described in section 8.1.2.239 
Especially in an outbreak situation, circumstances can change quickly, influencing 
knowledge, misconceptions and practices. Lower risk perceptions might therefore not be a 
sign of a lack of knowledge, but of having adopted enough protective practices to not feel at 
immediate risk of contracting the disease anymore. The finding that the more interactive 
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sources of communication (i.e. new media and community sources) were associated with 
increased risk perception also point to the interplay between individual and community levels 
as outlined in the SCT.  
An important element of SCT is the so-called ‘observational learning’, whereby behaviors are 
learned and practiced by seeing them in others, especially in role models. The information 
sources studied in Study I and II likely enjoyed varying levels of trust and had some 
characteristics of role models to the general public. The journalists in Study III were also 
trusted sources in their communities and might have been role models to some degree 
themselves. The journalists experienced first-hand that words they said on air, or stated by 
guests they invited to their studios, had consequences in their communities. One journalist 
described an incident whereby a studio guest started a rumor on the radio, after which a 
hospital in the area was attacked and vandalized. When journalists turned more into 
instructors later in the outbreak, they had to balance two other aspects of SCT: self-efficacy 
and expectations. As they explained, you can encourage people to call the Ebola hotline 
(increasing self-efficacy), but if in reality there are no hospital beds or ambulances available, 
it can hamper the public’s expectations and potentially undermine trust in the source of the 
information as well as in the response efforts in general.  
8.2.3 Agenda-setting theory 
Agenda-setting theory can help to further contextualize the various roles of the Sierra 
Leonean journalists in Study III.72,73,228 The media can never report about everything; there is 
always a selection process at play. The topics that the media chooses to focus on, are made 
more salient to the public. It has been shown that there is a strong correlation between what 
the media reports on and the importance the public assigns to that topic.72 This process of 
setting the agenda can be a passive byproduct of reporting; for instance, on topics that have 
inherent news value (e.g. upcoming elections).228 In their role as skeptical monitors in the 
first phase of the Ebola outbreak, agenda-setting was rather passive for the Sierra Leonean 
journalists. When they turned into public mobilizers later in the outbreak, agenda-setting was 
done proactively. In the final phase, as instructors, the journalists actually went beyond that – 
the Ebola outbreak was already the most salient topic. Instead, the focus turned to second-
level agenda-setting (i.e. framing the news) – with messages including elements of behavior 
change communication instead.254,255 
8.2.4 Debunking  
Trying to debunk misinformation is about changing someone’s mental model around a topic. 
It is not simply about learning new information, it is about re-learning information and 
updating or creating a new mental model. The HBM and SCT both mention the role 
communication can play in correcting misinformation. Study IV made use of trusted sources 
in the audio dramas, facilitating observational learning as outlined in the SCT. The audio 
dramas were created with an ecological perspective in mind, so that the content reflected how 
people normally encounter and handle ‘typhoid-malaria’. Debunking misinformation and 
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with that, re-learning information, poses challenges, as numerous studies have shown. Ideally 
one would like to study whether debunking has an effect on actual behavior, not just self-
reported behavior. As the SCT shows, support on community and societal level, as well as in 
the physical environment are likely needed to be able to make debunking efforts have a 
behavioral impact. In the case of Study IV, an added layer of difficulty is that people often 
hear about ‘typhoid-malaria’ from credible sources such as doctors and nurses in health 
centers. To be able to make debunking efforts have a lasting effect on knowledge and 
behavior, an ecological perspective would therefore imply implementing and evaluating 
interventions on all levels; from doctors and nurses, to the availability of better diagnostic 
tests, to empowering individuals to question a typhoid-malaria diagnosis and more 
restrictions on the availability of antibiotics.  
8.3 METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
8.3.1 Study design and data collection 
Various study designs were used for the four studies. Study I and Study II were retrospective 
quantitative analyses of three (Study II) or four KAP surveys (Study I). Study III was a 
qualitative interview study, and Study IV a randomized controlled trial. These study designs 
all come with their own strengths and limitations.  
The KAP surveys underlying Study I and Study II were cross-sectional surveys, carried out at 
different time points of the Ebola outbreak in Sierra Leone. Apart from the first survey, which 
was done in nine out of the 14 districts of Sierra Leone, surveys two to four were nationwide 
and included all districts. All surveys had relatively large sample sizes. Being able to adjust 
for potential confounders, and applying multilevel modeling, made for robust analyses. The 
respondents of the surveys were different in each survey round, so individual changes in 
knowledge and behavior could not be measured. For ethical reasons, respondents received an 
Ebola information sheet after completing the survey. A learning effect would therefore distort 
the results if the same respondents would be followed-up again in the next surveys. Whereas 
the surveys were carried out at different time points, they should be still considered as cross-
sectional surveys with their inherent limitations. With cross-sectional data, there is always a 
risk of reverse causality, so significant associations should be regarded as just that: 
associations. Even though temporality cannot be established with this type of data, the 
mediation analyses performed in Study I and II assume that the exposure happened before the 
mediator and the outcome. Ebola was a new disease in Sierra Leone, it can therefore be 
assumed that knowledge about the disease was low at the start of the outbreak, and most 
information came from the information sources included in Study I and II. So, at least on 
paper, both exposure and mediator most likely occurred before the outcome. It should also be 
noted that all behaviors that were asked about in the surveys were self-reported and might 
therefore not directly reflect how people behaved in real life.256 
Study III was a qualitative interview study, aiming to understand the roles and experiences of 
Sierra Leonean journalists who reported during the outbreak. A qualitative study provides in-
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depth insights that can give further meaning to a phenomenon, which is hard to obtain using 
quantitative methods. The role of the interviewer is important in qualitative studies; the level 
of established rapport with the interviewee can influence how the conversation flows and 
how interviewees answer the questions.257 As I carried out the interviews, my background in 
journalism was both a curse and a blessing. Being trained as a journalist was a blessing in that 
it might have been easier for me to establish rapport with the interviewees. Whereas I had no 
experience reporting in a health emergency, I understood the basic demands of their jobs. It 
might also have been a curse in that as a journalist, I was trained to hunt for the quotes, the 
soundbites and repeatedly asking the question ‘why?’. As a qualitative interviewer, you 
should let your interviewee be free to tell his or her story, with a limited amount of probing. I 
had to learn to restrain myself from asking the ‘why?’ question that was always on the tip of 
my tongue. Determining whether the sample size of a qualitative study is large enough, can 
be done by evaluating of the information power of the sample.258 According to this method, 
various dimension can impact the information power, such as the aim of the study, the 
specificity of the sample, the use of established theory, the quality of dialogue and the 
analysis strategy. While information power is not meant to give a conclusive sample size, 
studies that have a narrow aim, have a highly specific sample, use established theory, have 
strong dialogues and use case rather than cross-case analysis are considered to have more 
information power, and therefore smaller sample sizes can be sufficient.258 Applying this to 
Study III, one can argue that there was an underrepresentation of journalists from rural areas 
in the sample, which limited further cross-case analysis. Apart from one interview, the 
dialogues were rich. The overall information power of Study III was deemed to be sufficient.  
The randomized controlled trial that formed the basis for Study IV is a strong study design, 
which lends itself to examine cause-effect relationships between the tested interventions and 
the measured outcome.259 The main focus of the trial was on participants who were in 
possession of a phone with WhatsApp installed. This method could be criticized, as it might 
represent a population that is wealthier and potentially more educated than the average adult 
population of Sierra Leone. The participants of the trial indeed had a higher educational 
attainment compared to the general population of Western Area (6% of trial participants did 
not have any formal education versus 19% of the general population of Western Area).78 To 
ensure that participants of different demographic backgrounds could be included, as well as 
to test whether the interventions worked with a different method of administration, 60 
participants without WhatsApp were recruited. Just like in Studies I and II, the analyzed 
behaviors were self-reported, and thus might not reflect actual behavior.256 A major strength 
of the trial was that it aimed to counter prevalent real-world misinformation about health in a 
community setting.  
8.3.2 Social desirability bias 
The tendency to answer according to what is perceived to be socially desirable by the 
respondent can lead to social desirability bias. During the Ebola outbreak, health promotion 
and risk communication messages tried to raise awareness about the disease and informed the 
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public about protective practices. Knowing the messages of the official (inter)national 
response might have influenced the respondents of the KAP surveys to respond according to 
what they thought the enumerators wanted to hear as opposed to what they actually knew and 
practiced. The level of knowledge and protective behaviors of the public would then be 
overestimated, while the level of misconceptions and risk behaviors would be 
underestimated. To counter this potential bias, enumerators ensured respondents at the start of 
the survey that there were no repercussions to their answers, that their answers were 
anonymous and encouraged them to answer the questions truthfully. Furthermore, behavioral 
questions were asked in an open way, so that respondents were not triggered to a certain 
response. Despite these measures, social desirability might still have played a role in all KAP 
surveys – especially the ones that were done later in the outbreak when the general public had 
been exposed to risk communication messages longer.  
Social desirability bias may have also played a role during the interviews for Study III. As I, a 
white woman from Europe, conducted all the interviews, the journalists I spoke to may have 
had a certain idea in mind of how I would interpret the interviews and tell me their stories 
from that perspective. This could for instance be noticed in that the interviewees were not 
very strong in self-reflection and all ascribed great importance to the role of journalists during 
the Ebola outbreak. The four extra interviews that were carried out with other stakeholders 
and the peer examinations during the data analysis allowed for further contextualization.  
The tendency to answer socially desirable was of less concern for the Contagious 
Misinformation Trial. While almost all respondents had heard of ‘typhoid-malaria’, there had 
not been any large information campaigns targeting typhoid recently. It was therefore harder 
for participants to know what the socially desirable answer to some of the questions would 
be, which likely increased the chances of them answering honestly. Just as with the KAP 
surveys, the enumerators encouraged all participants to answer according to their beliefs and 
practices and ensured them that their answers would be treated anonymously.  
8.3.3 Instruments and validation 
Validation of data collection instruments is especially important in quantitative studies, as the 
(mis)use of instruments can greatly influence the results. The KAP surveys were not 
psychometrically validated before being deployed. This was due to the ongoing, 
unprecedented health emergency, which required fast data collection. However, all 
questionnaires were pilot tested before being used. The items in the KAP surveys were also 
used for KAP studies in neighboring Liberia and Guinea during the Ebola outbreak, which 
supports their usefulness to some extent. Methods to rapidly psychometrically validate newly 
developed (or adapted) survey items would be very useful in emergency settings.  
Similarly, the baseline and follow-up questionnaires developed and used for Study IV were 
not psychometrically validated, mainly due to constraints in resources. The instruments were 
adapted and inspired by the KAP surveys in Studies I and II, as well as KAP surveys used 
specifically for typhoid. Extensive pilot testing in Freetown helped to improve the 
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instruments. The two questions that were used for the primary outcomes (‘Can a person get 
typhoid from mosquitoes?’ and ‘Can you get typhoid without getting malaria?’) were yes/no 
questions - useful to get clear-cut answers. However, a Likert-type scale might have given 
more information regarding how certain participants were about their answers and to what 
extent the interventions moved their answers on the scale. 
8.3.4 Generalizability 
To determine the generalizability of the studies, one needs to look at the external validity of 
each study.260 The data for the KAP surveys underlying Studies I and II were generated using 
probability sampling, which should, in theory, give the general public equal chances to be 
included. Apart from the first KAP survey, in which nine out of 14 districts were sampled, 
surveys two till four included all districts of the country. The survey samples largely reflected 
the general population of Sierra Leone aged 15 years and older.261 It can therefore be said 
that, with some caveats, the results from Studies I and II were generalizable to the general 
adult population of Sierra Leone.  
The aim of Study III was to obtain a deeper understanding of the roles and experiences of 
Sierra Leonean journalists. As the journalists in the study were important and trusted 
gatekeepers of information, the results could be transferable to other low-income settings 
with reliance on local radio stations and help in planning risk communication strategies in 
health emergencies.  
Randomized controlled trials typically have high internal validity, but might suffer from 
lower external validity as the set-up does often not properly reflect reality.262,263 Pragmatic 
randomized controlled trials have higher external validity, since they are implemented in 
community settings, with interventions that could continue in absence of the research 
team.263–265 The Contagious Misinformation Trial could be seen as a hybrid between a classic 
RCT and a pragmatic RCT, with strict control (e.g. sending the audio dramas and checking 
who received them), but taking place in a community setting. The generalizability of the trial 
might therefore be higher than a classic RCT, especially considering that probability 
sampling was used to recruit the participants. Contrary to many other studies that have aimed 
to counter constructed misinformation among undergraduate students or through online 
survey experiments,140,167 the Contagious Misinformation Trial targeted real-life 
misinformation in a community setting, giving the results a higher external validity. 
However, the exact contents of the audio dramas are not generalizable outside of Sierra 
Leone as they were tailor-made to reflect the worldviews and experiences with typhoid and 
malaria in the country. The building blocks of the audio dramas (i.e. stories that are in line 
with worldviews, delivered by credible sources, repetition of the core messages), do have 
external validity – it would be interesting to test those in different settings and across different 




8.4.1 Risk communication should be a central pillar  
The four studies in this thesis have shed a light on the role of risk communication and 
misinformation in infectious disease outbreaks – especially looking at the 2014-2016 Ebola 
outbreak in Sierra Leone. Results from the quantitative and qualitative studies in Sierra Leone 
showed that information sources have an important role to play in an outbreak. This role can 
go in various directions; from increased knowledge and protective behavior to increased 
misconceptions and risk behavior. The interviews in Study III showed the importance of 
keeping local journalists well-informed, as well as engaging them in the response to an 
emergency. Results from the risk perception study (Study II) indicated that risk perception is 
a complex phenomenon that is difficult to measure with cross-sectional studies. As time 
passes and outbreak situations change, the change in knowledge and behavior will likely have 
influenced the perceived risk of contracting a disease. Messages during an outbreak need to 
be continuously updated and be aligned with the real situation on the ground. Just like the 
‘Ebola has no cure’ message was communicated for too long in Sierra Leone, the message to 
call the Ebola hotline when someone was sick was less effective when there were long 
waiting times for ambulances.26 The level and role of trust in various information sources and 
its influence on changing knowledge, attitudes and practices was not measured in the studies, 
but it would be important to do so in future health emergencies. Distrust has been shown to 
hamper the response, both in the West African Ebola outbreak and in the North Kivu Ebola 
outbreak in 2018-2019.4,266 As perceived trust in information sources can change over time, it 
should ideally be evaluated continuously in a health emergency. For instance, Ebola survivors 
faced stigmatizing attitudes in the first months of the outbreak.3 While some stigma persisted, 
a qualitative study among community members in Sierra Leone showed that later in the 
outbreak, Ebola survivors were regarded as highly trusted sources on outbreak-related 
information.267 Factors such as timeliness, completeness and clarification of the information 
can influence the perceived trust.268 Taken together, risk communication and community 
engagement should be one of the core pillars in outbreak response – not an afterthought.44,269 
Or, as has been suggested in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, effective risk 
communication should be considered a social determinant of health, alongside classic social 
determinants such as access to health care and education.270 
8.4.2 Test, trace, isolate and communicate 
Applying these findings and implications to the current coronavirus pandemic, one can see 
clear parallels. While commentators in high income countries wondered why it was so hard 
for Sierra Leoneans to avoid touching their loved ones during a burial ritual,271 simple 
practices such as keeping physical distance or wearing a face mask have become polarized 
and politicized topics in many places around the world in the current pandemic.272,273 
Effective risk communication has been hampered by widespread misinformation, distrust in 
organizations like the WHO and – as the pandemic continues – fatigue of public health 
measures.1,274,275 Furthermore, risk communication in the form of a dialogue with affected 
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communities have largely been lacking.269 Again, the focus is mostly on the biomedical part 
of the response, with slogans like ‘Test, Trace and Isolate’.276 Much more fitting would be 
‘Test, Trace, Isolate and Communicate’.  
While circumstances were very different, risk communication and community engagement 
lessons from West Africa can be translated to countries on other income levels as well. 
Dialogue and more engagement (which will also enhance a sense of ownership of the 
response45) can be achieved through, for instance, social media campaigns and online 
Question and Answer sessions. Through events, such as (online) townhalls, communities can 
be encouraged to co-create long-term sustainable public health measures. The government in 
the United Kingdom actively worked with social media influencers to promote and increase 
testing for COVID-19 among adolescents.277 These types of community-led ‘bottom-up 
approaches’ have been shown to have played an important role in the West African Ebola 
outbreak,278–280 but are overlooked and underused in the current pandemic.  
8.4.3 Battling an infodemic 
The results of the Contagious Misinformation Trial hold lessons for the rampant coronavirus 
misinformation pandemic, also dubbed the ‘infodemic’. As results of the trial have shown, 
real-life misinformation can be debunked. However, given the sheer amount of 
misinformation circulating, and the fact that misinformation often travels farther and faster 
than correct information,146 decisions need to be made as to what kind of misinformation 
should be prioritized. On top of the list should be misinformation with important behavioral 
implications.148 The building blocks of the interventions created for Study IV could be used 
to craft targeted debunking interventions in the current pandemic.  
But before interventions are created, it is important to get a deeper understanding of the 
reasons why the misinformation is spreading. Rumors and misinformation are often based on 
real concerns and are a way of trying to make sense of what is happening.3,4,281 Vaccination 
programs are no strangers to widespread misinformation.281 While it is easy to dismiss people 
holding the misinformed beliefs as ‘vaccine hesitant’, their concerns are often based on valid 
questions, but also on deep-rooted distrust in vaccines and the health system.282–284 They 
should be listened to and their concerns should be taken seriously.281 Doing so enables the 
creation of much more targeted debunking interventions. Just like with risk communication 
as outlined in section 8.4.2, engaging with communities and co-creating debunking 
interventions will enhance ownership and increase the chances of successfully countering 
misinformation.  
Debunking misinformation that is already spreading, is one way of battling the infodemic. 
Another method of addressing misinformation has a clear analogy with vaccines: the 
inoculation method. Similar to a vaccine, this implies being exposed to a weakened form of 
the (expected) misinformation and explaining why an argument is flawed from the outset.285 
‘Cognitive antibodies’ should protect a person from believing subsequent misinformation.285 
It usually also involves an explicit warning that misinformation can be expected. Studies 
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evaluating a game based on this theory show promising results, but are prone to various 
serious limitations.285–289 For instance, study participants were self-selected and knew that the 
goal of the game was to learn to resist misinformation.287 Effects of the inoculation seem to 
be short-lived.290,291 Still, inoculation (or ‘prebunking’) is potentially an interesting method 
that should be evaluated with more rigorous methods, which will also help to understand to 
what extent the cognitive antibodies work when exposed to misinformation on very different 
topics.  
Methodological issues are not limited to the inoculation method. As explained before, the 
large majority of studies that looked into debunking have relied on online survey experiments 
or on small samples of undergraduate students.140,167 Most studies used constructed 
misinformation, to which the study participants were not exposed before.167,170,187–190 Study 
IV addressed these limitations by debunking real-life misinformation in a community setting. 
However, there are limitations that affect all debunking studies: the lack of measuring 
behavioral outcomes.292 Instead, as a proxy, many studies (including Study IV) ask questions 
on self-reported (intentional) behavior. Whereas this might be an indicator of real-life 
practices, self-reported behavior is not the same as actual behavior and is often prone to social 
desirability bias.256 Creative solutions should be found and reliable methods to measure actual 
behavior should be developed to address this major shortcoming.  
To summarize, instead of focusing on de- or prebunking one piece of misinformation and 
measuring whether it had an effect on the belief in the misinformation, there are steps before 
and after that should be taken. The step before includes taking a holistic approach to the 
misinformation. This means creating an understanding of the reasons and concerns that 
underlie the misinformation, as well as understanding the social interactions and networks, 
and the levels of trust in various actors. This will help in creating dialogue and engagement 
and in findings ways to actually reach the people who hold the misinformed beliefs. The step 
after debunking means measuring actual behavior and studying whether the debunking efforts 
had an effect on it.  
In an ever-evolving pandemic where misinformation travels at lightning speed, this holistic 
approach might seem unrealistic. Enormous resources are needed to be able to address even a 
fraction of the widely circulating misinformation. Still, it is likely to be worth it. Because 
while misinformation has side-effects such as the erosion of trust in (health) authorities,148 
serious efforts to debunk misinformation through engaging with communities can have the 
benefit of restoring some of that trust, which can have a larger ripple effect on other 





Being exposed to various information sources over the course of the 2014-2016 Ebola 
outbreak in Sierra Leone was associated with increased knowledge and protective behavior, 
but also with misconceptions and risk behavior. The more information sources one was 
exposed to, the stronger these associations. It shows the need to have clear, transparent, and 
contextualized information available during the entire course of an epidemic. Being exposed 
to sources that are trusted and allow for dialogue (such as community sources and new 
media), was associated with an increased perception of risk of getting Ebola. The mixed 
findings regarding risk perception and various protective behaviors likely point to the 
complex interplay between behavior and risk perception – whereby adopting a behavior has 
an effect on how the risk of disease is perceived. However, the cross-sectional nature of the 
data does not allow for clear-cut conclusions. Temporal data is needed to establish this theory 
further.  
As trusted sources in their communities, Sierra Leonean journalists had an important role to 
play during the epidemic. However, in the first months of the outbreak, their work was 
undermined by a lack of forthcoming official information and a lack of knowledge about 
Ebola. The empowerment they felt after receiving training on the topic and the roles they 
took on as mobilizers and instructors, shows that local journalists can be vital partners in 
outbreak response. Their platforms should be leveraged in health emergencies to disseminate 
risk communication messages, not only by journalists, but also by trusted community 
members.  
Misinformation about Ebola was widespread during the outbreak in West Africa, and is 
similarly pervasive in the current coronavirus pandemic. The Contagious Misinformation 
Trial showed that prevalent beliefs in infectious disease misinformation can be successfully 
targeted and debunked. Whereas the audio drama interventions used in the trial were highly 
specific to the Sierra Leonean context, the elements (delivered by trusted sources, repeated 
exposure, and in line with existing worldviews) could be tested in other settings as well. A 
strategy which actively engages with the misinformation is likely to be more successful in 
debunking than merely focusing on the correct information.   
Taken together, the studies in this thesis show that risk communication and misinformation 
management should be key pillars in health emergency response and preparedness and need 
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